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 A MATTER OF TRUST:  
SHOULD NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES BAR 
CLAIMS FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
OF CONTRACT? 
ALLEN BLAIR

 
In this Article, Professor Allen Blair examines the enforceability of no-reliance clauses—
contractual disclaimers designed to prevent parties from relying on extra-contractual 
representations to prove fraudulent inducement claims.  Many courts are skeptical of such 
disclaimers and either refuse to enforce them or will enforce them only subject to substantial 
restrictions.  These courts base their decisions on generic moral prohibitions against lying.  This 
Article argues, however, that these courts reach their conclusion too easily. They presume that no-
reliance clauses can serve no legitimate contract function and thus never provide value to parties .  
But, in at least some cases between sophisticated parties, no-reliance clauses can—and do—serve 
valuable contract functions.  With the core assumption made by the majority of courts reluctant to 
enforce no-reliance clauses dispelled, this Article suggests that at least the generic formulations of a 
moral prohibition against fraud are insufficient to counterbalance the value gained by autonomous 
parties choosing what they rationally believe to be in their own best interests. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The liar, and only the liar, is invariably and universally 
despised, abandoned, and disowned.
1
 
 
Who or what can you trust when deciding whether or not to enter into a 
contract?  According to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, what 
contracting parties can trust—what they should trust—is the written language 
of the contract.
2
  After all, the Seventh Circuit reminds us, ―[m]emory plays 
tricks. . . . Prudent people protect themselves against the limitations of 
memory (and the temptation to shade the truth) by limiting their dealings to 
those memorialized in writing.‖3  Consequently, in the Seventh Circuit‘s view, 
contractual disclaimers designed to prevent parties from relying on extra-
contractual representations should be enforced.
4
  In the face of such 
disclaimers—what I will refer to as ―no-reliance clauses‖5—neither party 
 
1. 2 Samuel Johnson, The Adventurer, in THE YALE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF SAMUEL 
JOHNSON 362 (W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt & L. F. Powell eds., 1963). 
2. See Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 2000). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. These sorts of clauses are also commonly referred to as ―anti-reliance clauses‖ or ―waivers 
of reliance clauses.‖  See, e.g., Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004) (―[F]or a 
contract to bar a fraud in the inducement claim, the contract must contain language that, when read 
together, can be said to add up to a clear anti-reliance clause by which the plaintiff has contractually 
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should be able to maintain that it was fraudulently induced
6
 to enter into the 
contract.
7
  A growing number of courts agree with the Seventh Circuit and 
 
promised that it did not rely upon statements outside the contract‘s four corners in deciding to sign 
the contract.‖ (emphasis added)).  These clauses are also sometimes called ―big boy‖ clauses.  See, 
e.g., Extra Equipamentos e Exportação Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (―In 
the trade, no-reliance clauses are called ‗big boy‘ clauses (as in ‗we‘re big boys and can look after 
ourselves‘).‖).  For the purposes of this Article, I will use the term ―no-reliance clause‖ descriptively 
to include any contractual clause or set of clauses aimed at disclaiming or limiting liability for 
fraudulent representations made during precontractual negotiations. 
 Such clauses should be distinguished from generic merger or integration clauses because, as 
discussed in detail in Part III, some courts impose stringent normative requirements on no-reliance 
clauses, maintaining that they must be set apart from standard merger clauses, must not be, 
themselves, boilerplate, or must particularly disclaim the alleged misrepresentations.  Additionally, 
no-reliance clauses should be distinguished from clauses that operate to bar or limit claims for fraud 
based on representations made within the contract.  See generally, e.g., Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & 
W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006).  In Abry, the contract at issue contained a 
number of interlocking provisions designed to limit the plaintiff‘s post-closing recourse against the 
defendant.  Id. at 1044–45.  The particular provisions at issue, however, stated that, with respect to 
breaches of (or noncompliance with) any representations or warranties actually inside the Purchase 
Agreement, the plaintiff could recover only up to $20 million in damages.  Id. at 1044.  While stating 
in dicta that no-reliance clauses purporting to bar reliance on representations made outside of the 
contract would be enforceable, id. at 1041, the court in Abry determined that there were no legitimate 
justifications for a seller to seek protection for intentional lies that it makes about facts contained in a 
contract, id. at 1036 (―[I]t is difficult to identify an economically-sound rationale for permitting a 
seller to deny [a remedy] to a buyer when the seller is proven to have induced the contract‘s 
formation or closing by lying about a contractually-represented fact.‖).  While I believe that the Abry 
court‘s distinction is suspect, I limit my analysis in this Article to no-reliance clauses that focus on 
precontractual representations. 
6. This Article will consider only contractual disclaimers of alleged misrepresentations that 
form the predicates of fraudulent inducement claims.  Fraud in the factum, or fraud in the execution, 
as it is sometimes called, presents a different set of problems.  Misrepresentations constituting fraud 
in the inducement lead ―‗a party to assent to something he otherwise would not have; 
[misrepresentations constituting fraud in the factum] induce[] a party to believe the nature of his act 
is something entirely different than it actually is.‘‖  Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490 
(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Southwest Adm‘rs, Inc. v. Rozay‘s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 
1986)).  Accordingly, ―‗[f]raud in the [factum] arises when a party executes an agreement with 
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential 
terms. . . .  Fraud in the [factum] results in the agreement being void ab initio, whereas fraud in the 
inducement makes the transaction merely voidable.‘‖  Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d at 490 (quoting 
Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d at 774) (citation omitted); see also Sandvik AB v. Advent Int‘l Corp., 
220 F.3d 99, 109–10 (3d Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the 
execution); Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998, 1000 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(―Where misrepresentation of the character or essential terms of a proposed contract occurs, [i.e., 
fraud in the factum,] assent to the contract is impossible.  In such a case there is no contract at all.‖); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 cmt. a (1991) (same). 
7. See, e.g., Extra Equipamentos e Exportação Ltda., 541 F.3d at 724 (―No-reliance clauses 
serve a legitimate purpose in closing a loophole in contract law (thus resisting, in Judge Kozinski‘s 
colorful expression, the metastasizing of contract law into tort law . . . ).‖) (citation omitted); 
Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating, in 
dicta, that the logic of Rissman should apply outside of the securities context, and no-reliance clauses 
should be allowed to bar fraudulent inducement claims). 
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enforce, without significant restriction, no-reliance clauses to defeat claims of 
fraudulent inducement.
8
 
Many courts, however, disagree.
9
  Following the traditional view that 
fraud vitiates all that it touches,
10
 some courts categorically refuse to enforce 
no-reliance clauses, leaving contracting parties exposed to intentional fraud 
claims.  For instance, in the California Court of Appeals‘ view, 
 
[a] party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud in its 
inducement cannot absolve himself from the effects of his 
fraud by any stipulation in the contract, either that no 
representations have been made, or that any right which 
might be grounded upon them is waived.
11
 
 
Other courts will sometimes enforce no-reliance clauses, but only with 
significant restrictions.
12
 
The upshot is that courts and commentators addressing the enforceability 
of no-reliance clauses have a long history of disagreeing.
13
  Opposing 
arguments get framed between two familiar poles: freedom of contract and the 
moral repugnance of fraud.  So framed, the disagreement about the 
enforceability of no-reliance clauses invokes an ancient divide in our 
jurisprudence between contract and tort law.  Mapping this divide, however, 
 
8. See infra Part II.C. 
9. See infra Part II.A and B. 
10. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Carpenter, 554 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1976) (―[A] contract with an 
innocent principal [can] be rescinded on the basis of the fraudulent representations of his agent 
despite a disclaimer clause because the fraud complained of vitiates the entire transaction, including 
the disclaimer clause.‖ (quotation omitted)); Pearson & Son, Ltd. v. Dublin Corp. [1907] A.C. 351, 
362 (H.L) (appeal taken from Ir.) (―[F]raud vitiates every contract and every clause in it.‖).  
11. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 
788 n.7 (1995) (favorably quoting 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONTRACTS §130 
410, 368–69 (9th ed. 1987)).  But see Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 372 
(2005) (stating that the Ron Greenspan rule ―does not mean the contract provision is in every case 
irrelevant‖ and concluding that a particularized no-reliance clause sufficed as evidence that plaintiff 
did not rely on defendant‘s statements). 
12. See infra Part II.B. 
13. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, 117 YALE L.J. 2, 6 
(2007) (―There is a longstanding debate within the courts and legal scholarship about whether parties 
should be able to contract out of liability for their fraudulent misrepresentations.‖).  Professor Klass 
cites two examples of recent scholarship on this issue: Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, 
the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 507–13 
(1999) (arguing that no-reliance clauses can best be justified as mechanisms for reducing agency 
costs in contractual negotiations); and Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and 
Half-Truths: Business Acquisition Agreements and the Right To Lie, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 431, 449 
(2007) (urging adoption of a rule that allows no-reliance clauses to the extent that extra-contractual 
representations conflict with a contractual representation or the contract is silent about the subject 
matter of the extra-contractual representation).  Klass, supra, at 6 n.5. 
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has famously been fraught with difficulty.
14
  It represents a conflict between 
sometimes competing primary principles, one of which must take priority in a 
given instance.
15
  On the one hand, the law should encourage people to be 
diligent in protecting their own interests and respect their choices with regard 
to such matters; on the other hand, the law should encourage honesty and fair 
dealing in business transactions.
16
  Conflicts between these primary principles 
have often left a trail of analytical confusion in their wake and given little 
practical guidance to contracting parties. 
This Article aims to help clear such confusion, at least with respect to no-
reliance clauses contained in commercial contracts between sophisticated 
parties.
17
  I contend that an analysis of the enforceability of no-reliance 
 
14. In 1953, for instance, Professor William Prosser stated that ―the borderland of tort and 
contract, and the nature and limitations of the tort action arising out of a breach of contract are poorly 
defined.‖  WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 452 (1953); see also, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Contortions Along the 
Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 458–60 (1994) (describing the 
challenges of drawing boundaries between tort and contract); Richard E. Speidel, The Borderland of 
Contract, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 163, 164–66 (1983) (tracing the uncertain and often confusing historic 
distinctions between tort and contract). 
15. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–91 (1961) (explaining that primary principles 
are beliefs or moral obligations shared by a relatively homogenous society); see also Eric A. Posner, 
The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 68 
(F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (noting that formalist criticisms of the unconscionability doctrine require 
―direct application of a moral theory, rather than the application of second-order rules‖). 
16. Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790–1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 405, 407.  William Powers, Jr. describes the differences between torts and contracts as 
follows: ―The tort paradigm reflects the ideology and rhetoric of reasonableness . . . .  The contract 
paradigm reflects the ideology of freedom and consent and carries the principles of autonomy, 
individuality, and privacy into commerce via the market.‖  William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1213–14 (1994); see also Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 
268 (N.J. 1997) (―Implicit in the distinction [between contract and tort] is the doctrine that a tort duty 
of care protects against the risk of accidental harm and a contractual duty preserves the satisfaction of 
consensual obligations.‖ (citations omitted)); Dalley, supra, at 407 n.6 (discussing this historic 
tension and citing several cases in which courts advocated for honesty and fair dealing and several 
cases in which courts advocated for prudent business decisions).  So framed, the tensions between the 
paradigms are evident and have been much discussed.  E.g., Daniel Markovits, Making and Keeping 
Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 1325, 1326–27 (2006) (stating that arguments about these differences 
―have recently received extensive attention under a variety of headings—including the rise of the 
welfare state, the tortification of contract law, and the development of a discourse of 
anticommodification‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
17. In this Article, I focus exclusively on contracts between sophisticated parties with relatively 
equal bargaining power.  No-reliance clauses may well present particular concerns in consumer 
contracts or contracts involving radically disparate bargaining power.  Accordingly, I take no 
position in this Article on the enforceability of no-reliance clauses in such contracts, opting instead to 
distinguish, at least roughly, between consumer contracts and commercial contracts.  See, e.g., All-
Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing a distinction 
between ―commercial contracting parties‖ and ―consumers, and other individuals not engaged in 
business‖ for the purposes of the potential application of the economic loss doctrine to bar claims of 
fraud); Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 
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clauses should begin by examining a core puzzle: why would any rational 
party
18
 in an arms-length contract ever agree to a provision limiting or 
eliminating her recovery in cases when the other party intentionally lies to 
her?
19
  This puzzle is particularly interesting considering that many 
commercial contracts contain these clauses.
20
 
Courts on both ends of the enforcement spectrum, however, have avoided 
consideration of this puzzle.
21
  Courts reluctant to enforce no-reliance clauses 
avoid the puzzle by either explicitly or implicitly assuming that no-reliance 
clauses have no legitimate value for contracting parties.  Such clauses are 
mere licenses to lie.
22
  With this assumption in place, courts easily justify their 
decision not to enforce no-reliance clauses, or to enforce them only subject to 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 496, 538 (2004) (noting that ―distinctions [are] drawn in the case law and in the 
commentary between different sorts of contracts; it is generally acknowledged that formalism is 
relatively more important to experienced commercial actors, and substantive interpretation better 
suited to transactions involving consumers and other amateurs,‖ but also noting that no systematic 
attempt to draw this distinction exists in domestic contract law); Robert E. Scott, The Law and 
Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANNU. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 281 (2006) (―Contracts 
involving individual consumers raise separate issues that challenge the assumption that their 
commitments are voluntary, rational and informed.‖); William J. Woodward, Jr., ―Sale‖ of Law and 
Forum and the Widening Gulf Between ―Consumer‖ and ―Nonconsumer‖ Contracts in the UCC, 75 
WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244 (1997) (―Nobody doubts any longer that ‗consumer contracts‘ are different 
from fully negotiated contracts of the classical model.  Consumers are seldom represented by lawyers 
in their contractual dealings, and we tend to think that, as a group, they have a lower level of legal 
sophistication than those with whom they typically make contracts.‖). 
18. Contracting parties, I assume, are rational in the sense that they only enter into contracts 
that they believe will make them better off.  See, e.g., Scott, supra note 17, at 280 (assuming that 
contracting parties ―act rationally, within the constraints of their environment, in the sense that they 
wish to contract if they believe the arrangement will make them better off and not otherwise‖); 
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
597, 602 (1990) (―If we assume rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of 
particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual risk allocation is to maximize the expected 
value of the contract for both parties.  Only by allocating risks in order to maximize the joint 
expected benefits from their contractual relationship can the parties hope to maximize their 
individual utility.‖). 
19. This is precisely the sort of puzzle that occupies Professor Victor Goldberg‘s energies in his 
recent book.  VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2006).  
In his book, Professor Goldberg advances a brand of economic analysis that eschews formal 
modeling, preferring instead to focus tightly on the transaction.  Professor Goldberg suggests that by 
asking, ―Why might reasonable, profit-seeking actors structure their relationship in a particular 
way?,‖ id. at 2, economic analysis can offer insights into not only contract interpretation but also 
contract rules, both mandatory and default, see id. 
20. Davis, supra note 13, at 485 (―Disclaimers of liability for pre-contractual 
misrepresentations are common features of all kinds of contracts, ranging from the complex 
agreements of purchase and sale used in connection with the acquisition of businesses, to contracts 
for the sale or the lease of consumer goods.‖). 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. This phrase was first used by Professor Kevin Davis when discussing no-reliance clauses.  
See Davis, supra note 13, at 485.  Professor Davis, however, advances several compelling arguments 
favoring the enforcement of no-reliance clauses.  See id. 
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significant restrictions, by parroting generic notions that lying and fraud are 
morally reprehensible.  After all, if the parties gain no legitimate value from 
no-reliance clauses,
23
 then freedom of contract with respect to such clauses 
has no moral or practical weight.
24
  It takes only a modest argument against 
these clauses to justify a refusal to enforce them.  But courts that do enforce 
no-reliance clauses without significant restrictions have, in the main, also 
failed to address this puzzle, rehearsing instead superficial freedom-of-
contract rationales that fail to meet the concerns of courts in the opposing 
camp. 
While I ultimately suggest that no-reliance clauses should be enforced 
without significant restrictions, my primary goal is not to advocate for one 
rule or another.
25
  Instead, my primary goal is to advance the debate about the 
enforceability of no-reliance clauses.
26
  I argue that courts reluctant to enforce 
 
23. The term ―value‖ is being used in its most capacious sense.  This Article assumes that 
―[h]uman beings value goods, things, relationships, and states of affairs in diverse ways.‖  Cass R.  
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 782 (1994) (citing 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 8–11 (1993)).  Thus, it assumes that 
values are plural and that they cannot be reduced to and compared along a single unitary metric.  See 
id. at 784 (arguing that ―[d]ifferent kinds of valuation cannot without significant loss be reduced to a 
single ‗superconcept,‘ like happiness, utility, or pleasure‖); see also Eric A. Posner, The Strategic 
Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1185, 1185 (1998) (describing advocates of this position as arguing ―that people can choose among 
options, but that the choice depends on qualitative differences between options that cannot be 
reduced to vectors on a single dimension of evaluation‖). 
24. For an example of a powerful justification for courts interfering with the choices that 
contracting parties might make about the design of their contracts when that design does not serve 
legitimate economic goals, see generally Robin West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of 
Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner , 99 HARV. L. REV. 
384 (1985). 
25. The question of whether no-reliance clauses should be enforced can be thought of as a 
choice about whether prohibitions against fraud should constitute mandatory or default rules.  See Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989).  Contracting parties may freely opt out of default rules.  See id.  
Unlike default rules, however, mandatory rules may not be varied or waived by contracting parties, 
even if both would choose to do so.  See id.  Mandatory rules impose standards of procedural or 
substantive fairness on the parties.  These bargaining constraints may be 
 
justified either by ―externalities‖ or ―paternalism‖ in that lawmakers might 
make rules mandatory to protect people not in contractual privity (e.g., as in the 
mandatory prohibition of criminal conspiracies) or to protect people who are 
parties to the contract itself (e.g., as in the mandatory prohibition against 
contracting with infants). 
Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
897, 901 (1999). 
26. I subscribe to the notion that the primary goal of contract law should be to achieve 
efficiency goals and thereby maximize social welfare gains.  While I recognize that there are other 
goals that contract law might serve, I do not, in this Article, revisit the debate on the propriety of 
using efficiency analysis.  For a discussion of criticisms of the selection of efficiency as the goal to 
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no-reliance clauses rest their decisions on a faulty premise.  Contrary to this 
premise, both buyers and sellers in arms-length contracts regularly have 
legitimate and compelling reasons to include no-reliance clauses in their 
contracts and to want courts to enforce these clauses without restrictions.
27
  
Once the core assumption made by the majority of courts reluctant to enforce 
these clauses has been dispelled, I argue that at least the generic formulations 
of a moral prohibition against fraud are insufficient to counterbalance the 
value
28
 gained by autonomous parties choosing what they rationally believe to 
be in their own self-interest.  Thus, courts should either enforce no-reliance 
clauses without restrictions or carefully articulate a more robust moral basis 
for a public policy prohibition against them. 
My argument proceeds in three parts.  Part II catalogues the current state 
of the law with respect to no-reliance clauses.  This Part identifies three basic 
categories of approaches that courts take.  First, some courts (in Category I) 
simply refuse to enforce no-reliance clauses.  Second, some courts (in 
Category II) will enforce such clauses only subject to one or more substantial 
limitations.  Finally, a growing number of courts (in Category III) are willing 
to enforce no-reliance clauses, at least between sophisticated parties.  Part II 
concludes that a significant number of cases fall into Categories I or II. In 
other words, many courts either prohibit or place significant restrictions on the 
enforcement of no-reliance clauses. 
 
be achieved by contract rules, see Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions From 
Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 91, 100 (1993).  Instead, this Article is written in the 
spirit of Professor Cass Sunstein‘s call to recognize the plurality of values in order to more clearly 
see what is at stake in the adoption of one legal rule or another.  See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 782.  
As Professor Sunstein points out, 
 
to see values as incommensurable, and to say that people are really disputing 
appropriate kinds (not levels) of valuation, is not by itself to resolve legal 
disputes.  It is necessary to say something about the right kind—to offer a 
substantive theory—and to investigate the particulars in great detail, in order to 
make progress in hard cases in law.  But an understanding of problems of 
incommensurability will make it easier to see what is at stake. 
Id.  This Article endeavors to encourage a more detailed investigation of the particulars of no-
reliance clauses so that courts and commentators can more clearly see what is at stake in choices 
about the enforceability of such clauses. 
27. See infra Part IV. 
28. As I explain in Part III in more detail, I am not attempting to make a commensurabilist 
claim about the value of no-reliance clauses compared to the value of prohibitions against fraud.  
Instead, I assume that the values at play are incommensurable, but only in a weak sense.  See, e.g., 
Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L.J.  
813, 815–17 (1993) (describing the difference between ―strong‖ and ―weak‖ incommensurability).  In 
other words, I contend that even though the values of no-reliance clauses and prohibitions against 
fraud are not commensurable, when they are in conflict, a rational choice between the two can be—
and must be—made. 
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Part III argues that the general reluctance of most courts to enforce no-
reliance clauses rests on one of two highly simplified and often merely 
implied approaches to the morality of lying, one deontological and the other 
consequentialist.  Part III concludes, however, that with the exception of only 
a rare, die-hard brand of Kantianism, neither deontological nor 
consequentialist rationales for opposing lying are categorical.  Both 
deontologists and consequentialists recognize that prohibitions against lying 
can and often do give way to other moral imperatives or primary principles.  
Accordingly, even presuming that sound moral arguments exist in favor of 
requiring sellers to make honest representations, courts, faced with 
autonomous parties that have voluntarily included no-reliance clauses in their 
contracts, should compare the value embodied in that contract-design choice 
with the value protected by moral arguments against lying.  Courts have 
avoided making this comparison, I contend, by presuming that the contract 
design side of the balance has no weight.  As a result of essentially ―rigging 
the game,‖ courts have not only ignored legitimate justifications that might 
prompt rational buyers and sellers to include no-reliance clauses in their 
contracts, but also systematically under-articulated the supposed moral basis 
of their reluctance to enforce such clauses. 
Part IV takes seriously the notion, denied by the majority assumption 
regarding no-reliance clauses, that parties are generally acting in what they 
believe to be their own best interest.
29
  If parties are acting in their own 
interest, then some consideration of the value that parties who include no-
reliance clauses in their contracts must be attaching to them is due.  Part V 
engages in such a consideration.  It concludes that there are at least four 
legitimate and compelling reasons why parties might want no-reliance clauses 
and at least three reasons why parties would be willing to acquiesce to such 
clauses. 
II. KNOWING LIES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
WITH RESPECT TO NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES 
When my love swears that she is made of truth, I do believe 
her, though I know she lies.
30
 
 
Commercial transactions rarely, if ever, follow the neat chronology of 
classic contract law.
31
  Instead, such transactions are dynamic.  Rather than be 
 
29. In Judge Richard Posner‘s words, ―man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his 
satisfactions—what we shall call his ‗self-interest.‘‖  RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977). 
30. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 138, in SHAKESPEARE‘S SONNETS 278 (A.L. Rowse ed., 
3d ed. 1984). 
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punctuated by distinct offers and acceptances, contractual expectations 
develop over time through the repeated and varied exchanges and negotiations 
of parties.
32
  This is particularly true in complex transactions where numerous 
agents of buyers and sellers are engaged in multiple discussions of various 
facets of the deal. 
The need for extensive precontractual negotiations stems, in large part, 
from the fact that parties lack knowledge about one another.
33
  Buyers know 
little about the characteristics and qualities of sellers and their promised 
performances, including sellers‘ propensities to act opportunistically.34  This 
sort of uncertainty,
35
 of course, is pervasive in all contractual negotiations, but 
 
31. The classical conception of contract law (often referred to as ―formalism‖) strove for 
scientific precision in the deduction and application of acontextual rules.  See Larry A. DiMatteo, 
Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 397, 416–17 
(2004) (citing CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at 
vi, vii (1871)).  Variously associated with Samuel Williston, Christopher Langdell, and Joseph Beale, 
among others, the classical model of contract was ―[a]bstract conceptualism or formalism.‖  Id. at 
416.  Melvin Eisenberg has described the classical model of contract as ―axiomatic and deductive.  It 
was objective and standardized.  It was static.  It was implicitly based on a paradigm of bargains 
made between strangers transacting on a perfect market.  It was based on a rational-actor model of 
psychology.‖  Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L.  
REV. 805, 805 (2000).  Lawrence Friedman has described the classical model of contract this way: 
 
[T]he ―pure‖ law of contract is an area of what we can call abstract 
relationships.  ―Pure‖ contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter and 
person.  It does not ask who buys and who sells, and what is bought and 
sold. . . .  Contract law is abstraction—what is left in the law relating to 
agreements when all particularities of person and subject-matter are 
removed. . . .  The abstraction of classical contract law is not unrealistic; it is a 
deliberate renunciation of the particular, a deliberate relinquishment of the 
temptation to restrict untrammeled individual autonomy or the completely free 
market in the name of social policy. 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 
20 (1965). 
32. See, e.g., Eisenberg supra note 31, at 810 (―Promissory transactions seldom occur in an 
instant . . . .  [C]ontract law, if it is to effectuate the objectives of parties to promissory transactions, 
must reflect the reality of contracting by adopting dynamic rules that parallel that reality, rather than 
static rules that deny that reality.‖). 
33. For the sake of simplicity, I will presume from this point forward that representations are 
being made by a seller to a buyer.  A buyer, however, may also make representations to the seller on 
which the seller might rely.  Thus, the roles of the parties could be reversed in any given case without 
changing the substance of the remainder of this Part of the Article.  
34. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47–49 (1985).  Trade will be worthwhile if it will produce a 
joint welfare surplus for the parties.  In other words, trade will be worthwhile if it will be a ―win/win 
situation for both parties (assuming that the promises are rational, voluntary and informed).  If the 
welfare gains that both parties anticipate are greater than the expected costs, including the predicted 
costs of regret, then both parties will be better off . . . .‖  Scott, supra note 17, at 282–83. 
35. From a purely economic perspective, ―uncertainty‖ in contracts may be said to exist when 
the probability or value of alternative outcomes under the contract cannot be measured.  Uncertainty 
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it becomes exacerbated in complex deals.  Parties do not know what the 
probability of reaching an agreement is, or even how much time and money 
they should expend to find out.
36
  As Professors Hermalin, Katz, and Craswell 
explain, ―[i]n order to conduct exchange, the parties not only must find each 
other, but they must also determine whether trade is worthwhile.‖37 
Parties gain this knowledge during the course of precontractual exchanges 
and negotiations.  They make representations in order to learn more about one 
another and the quality and likelihood of their respective performances.  Such 
representations might be made at a sales pitch or over dinner after a hard day 
of negotiating.  They might be made orally, or they might be made in writing.  
Whatever their nature and formality, parties may rely to some degree on these 
representations in deciding whether to consummate the deal. 
The problem is that not every representation made by a party during 
negotiations should be relied on.
38
  Sellers often puff their products or 
services.
39
  And both parties sometimes over-optimistically predict their 
 
exists, in other words, when ―there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability 
whatever.‖  John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q.J. ECON. 209, 214 (1937).  
Uncertainty can then be distinguished from risk, which involves contingent outcomes of known 
probability.  See id. 
36. During this initial period of uncertainty before a contract is formed, each party must decide 
when and whether to make investments of various kinds.  If a contract is never consummated, 
precontractual investments may be forever lost.  In these circumstances, parties sometimes seek to be 
compensated for investments that they made in reliance on representations made by their 
counterparty.  Familiar cases like Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965), 
reflect a liberal approach to the award of such compensation.  Id. at 274–75; see also E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed 
Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 222 (1987) (―In recent decades, courts have shown increasing 
willingness to impose precontractual liability.‖); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The 
Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 
496 (1983) (―[I]t is clear that promissory estoppel has been used to enforce promises too indefinite or 
incomplete to constitute valid offers.‖).  For an excellent treatment of Red Owl and the issue of 
precontractual reliance, see Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of 
Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007); see also, e.g., Richard Craswell, Offer, 
Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 495, 504–05 (1996); Jay M. Feinman, 
Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 694 (1984); Jason Scott Johnston, 
Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation , 85 VA. 
L. REV. 385, 496–99 (1999); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of 
Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1255–56 (1996); Charles L. 
Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 686–90 (1969); Peter Linzer, 
Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 
717–20.  The enforceability of no-reliance clauses involves similar but not identical concerns. 
37. Richard Craswell, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Avery W. Katz, Contract Law, in HANDBOOK 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 53, 59 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
38. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brennan, No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at *8 (N.D. 
Tex. July 29, 2005) (recognizing that many statements made during the negotiation of a business 
transaction are intended to be ―merely informational, and . . . not meant by either party to supplant 
the sophisticated purchaser‘s own research as the ultimate basis for his purchasing decision‖). 
39. One marketing text defines ―puffery‖ in the following manner: 
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capacity or willingness to perform.  Perhaps more significantly, however, 
during the imbricating exchanges that characterize complex transactions, 
parties or any one of their agents working on a deal may make assertions that 
appear to mean one thing in one context and seem to mean something quite 
different in a later context.
40
  One party may hear one thing at the time an 
assertion is made but recall hearing another thing at a later date.  To 
complicate matters further, in some complex transactions, a seller‘s product or 
service may function differently in the context of a buyer‘s particular 
objectives.  Thus, sellers may not completely understand their own products 
or services, at least in the context of the deal presented, and without a high 
degree of information exchange, they may make inadvertent but material 
misstatements about the quality or character of their goods or services.  
 
 
[P]uffery: advertising copy that indulges in subjective exaggeration in its 
descriptions of a product or service, such as ―an outstanding piece of luggage.‖ 
Puffery is always a matter of opinion on the part of the advertiser and often will 
use words such as ―the best‖ or ―the greatest‖ in describing the good qualities of 
a product or service. Sometimes puffery is extended into an exaggeration that is 
obviously untrue and becomes an outright parody, such as, ―This perfume will 
bring out the beast in every man!‖ 
JANE IMBER & BETSY-ANN TOFFLER, DICTIONARY OF MARKETING TERMS 458 (2000); see also, 
e.g., Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 2004) (―Puffery and 
statements of fact are mutually exclusive.  If a statement is a specific, measurable claim or can be 
reasonably interpreted as being a factual claim, i.e., one capable of verification, the statement is one 
of fact.  Conversely, if the statement is not specific and measurable, and cannot be reasonably 
interpreted as providing a benchmark by which the veracity of the statement can be ascertained, the 
statement constitutes puffery.‖). 
 Of course, distinguishing between puffery and factual representations is anything but a science.  
See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1403–04 (2006) 
(―Because neither courts nor regulators consider empirical evidence about which claims imply facts, 
their application of a nominally coherent doctrine creates a host of decisions in which relatively 
similar language receives different levels of protection.‖); id. at 1403 & n.43 (stating that while 
―authorities assume it is possible to distinguish factual from nonfactual speech by looking at the 
speech itself[,]‖ researchers argue ―it is not easy to distinguish speech conveying factual claims from 
speech that does not, and that much of the speech that the FTC refers to as puffery in fact implies 
facts, which themselves might be false‖ (emphasis omitted)).  In light of this difficulty, Professor 
Hoffman recommends presumptive, though not strict, liability for false statements in the absence of 
better knowledge about how puffery affects listeners, as well as evidence of speakers‘ intent to 
manipulate consumer responses.  See id. at 1444. 
40. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in 
Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 326 (2004) (recognizing that language means 
different things in different contexts); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 542 
(1960) (―[S]ome of the surrounding circumstances always must be known before the meaning of the 
words can be plain and clear; and proof of the circumstances may make a meaning plain and clear 
when in the absence of such proof some other meaning may also have seemed plain and clear.‖ 
(footnote omitted)). 
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Complex transactions, in short, involve mistakes, exaggerations, and 
miscommunications.
41
 
In the face of potential confusion and strife, parties employ various 
contractual devices designed to delineate the precise scope and content of 
their promissory representations.  One virtually ubiquitous device is the 
merger or integration clause,
42
 which invokes the parol evidence rule to bar 
proof of representations made prior to, or contemporaneous with, a 
completely integrated contract that would contradict or supplement the 
contract.
43
  Merger clauses, however, protect only contracts.
44
  Thus, if a 
buyer alleges that she was fraudulently induced
45
 to enter into the contract by 
 
41. See, e.g., One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 668 F. Supp. 693, 698 (D.D.C. 1987) 
(describing how, ―[a]fter eight months of vigorous negotiations, the parties reached a final agreement 
that was lengthy, detailed and comprehensive.  During these eight months many offers, promises and 
representations were made and several preliminary agreements were drafted.  To avoid a 
misunderstanding and to make clear that the only understanding between the parties was that 
expressed in the Agreement, the parties agreed that the Agreement ‗supersede[d] any and all previous 
understandings and agreements.‘‖ (emphasis omitted)). 
42. An integration or merger clause is a provision in a contract that recites that the written 
terms cannot be ―varied by prior or oral agreements because all such agreements have been 
[integrated or] merged into the written document.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (5th ed. 1979).  
Standard merger clauses look something like the following: ―‗This writing contains the entire 
agreement of the parties and there are no promises, understandings, or agreements of any kind 
pertaining to this contract other than stated herein.‘‖  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS § 7.6a (1990) (footnote omitted). 
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 215, 216(1) (1981); UCC § 2-202 
(2005). 
44. See, e.g., Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 
2002) (―Doctrine aside, all an integration clause does is limit the evidence available to the parties 
should a dispute arise over the meaning of the contract.  It has nothing to do with whether the 
contract was induced . . . by fraud.‖). 
45. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes three general categories of 
misrepresentation:  fraudulent, negligent, and innocent.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 525–49 (fraudulent); 552 (negligent); 552C (innocent) (1977).  Fraudulent misrepresentation, 
sometimes referred to as deceit, requires: (1) a misrepresentation of (2) a material fact (3) that the 
defendant knew or should have known was false (4) made by the defendant to the plaintiff with the 
intent to induce plaintiff‘s reliance.  Additionally, (5) the plaintiff must actually and justifiably rely 
on the misrepresentation (6) to her detriment.  See id. §§ 525–49. 
 If a contract was induced by fraud, the promisee may affirm the contract and sue for breach or 
void the contract.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164.  If the promisee voids the 
contract, she can recover damages in tort for the promisor‘s intentional misrepresentations.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549.  This section provides: 
 
(1) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to recover as 
damages in an action of deceit against the maker the pecuniary loss to him of 
which the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including 
(a) the difference between the value of what he has received in the 
transaction and its purchase price or other value given for it; and 
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the recipient‘s 
reliance upon the misrepresentation. 
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a seller‘s misrepresentations, and the validity of the contract is therefore 
called into question, the buyer is permitted to adduce evidence of the 
allegedly fraudulent representations, even if those representations would 
otherwise be barred by the parol evidence rule.
46
 
 
One consequence of the [rule that integration clauses do not 
bar claims sounding in tort] is that parties to contracts who do 
want to head off the possibility of a fraud suit will sometimes 
insert a ―no-reliance‖ clause into their contract, stating that 
neither party has relied on any representations made by the 
other.
47
 
 
Such clauses may provide that ―[n]either party has made any representation 
with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement to induce its execution 
 
(2) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business transaction is 
also entitled to recover additional damages sufficient to give him the benefit of 
his contract with the maker, if these damages are proved with reasonable 
certainty. 
Id. 
46. See, e.g., Betz Labs., Inc. v. Hines, 647 F.2d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 1981) (―[E]vidence of fraud 
in the inducement is outside the parol evidence rule and, consequently, admissible.‖); Aplications 
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 134–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing several cases to this 
effect); Withers v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 567 So. 2d 253, 255 (Ala. 1990) (―It is true that fraud can 
be an exception to the parol evidence rule.‖ (citations omitted)); Formento v. Encanto Bus. Park, 744 
P.2d 22, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (stating as a ―well-settled‖ rule that ―a party ‗can not free himself 
from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract‘‖ (quoting Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 
332 P.2d 493, 495 (Ariz. 1958))); Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 73 
(Colo. 1991) (en banc) (finding that the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive contract law and 
does not apply to tort actions); Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal ―Z‖ Ena, Inc., 598 A.2d 1234, 1235–36 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (―Introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove fraud in the inducement, 
however, is a well recognized exception to the parol evidence rule.‖); Wilburn v. Stewart, 794 P.2d 
1197, 1199 (N.M. 1990) (―[P]arol evidence is admissible to show any misrepresentations that 
induced the parties to contract.‖); Gilliland v. Elmwood Props., 391 S.E.2d 577, 580–81 (S.C. 1990) 
(―The parol evidence rule has been held inapplicable to tort causes of action (including negligent 
misrepresentation) since the rule is one of substantive contract law.‖); MacFarlane v. Manly, 264 
S.E.2d 838, 840 (S.C. 1980) (―The ‗as is‘ clause of the contract does not constitute an absolute 
defense to an action for fraud and deceit.‖); Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis, 185 S.E.2d 739, 742 (S.C. 
1971) (stating that if the contract was formed ―with a fraudulent intent of the party claiming under it,  
then parol evidence is competent to prove the facts which constitute the fraud‖); Stamp v. Honest 
Abe Log Homes, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (―The general rule is that parol 
evidence is not admissible to contradict, alter, or vary the terms of a written instrument, except upon 
grounds of estoppel, fraud, accident or mistake.‖ (citations omitted)).  But see, e.g., One-O-One 
Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (―Were we to permit plaintiffs‘ use of 
the defendants‘ prior representations . . . to defeat the clear words and purpose of the Final 
Agreement‘s integration clause, ‗contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written.‘‖ 
(quoting Tonn v. Philco Corp., 241 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1968))). 
47. Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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except as specifically set forth herein,‖48 or they may provide that ―‗none of 
[the parties] is relying upon any statement or representation of any agent of 
the parties being released hereby. Each of [the parties] is relying on his or her 
own judgment.‘‖49  Whatever their particular form, no-reliance clauses have 
the same goal: limit or eliminate tort liability for potential misstatements 
made during precontractual negotiations.
50
  As Judge Posner puts it: 
 
48. Becker v. Allcom, Inc., No. C04-0958L, 2005 WL 1654524, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 
2005); see also, e.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. 1959) (―The Seller 
has not made and does not make any representations as to the physical condition, rents, leases, 
expenses, operation or any other matter or thing affecting or related to the aforesaid premises, except 
as herein specifically set forth, and the Purchaser hereby expressly acknowledges that no such 
representations have been made . . . .‖ (emphasis and quotation omitted)).  In this form, such clauses 
are sometimes referred to as no-representation clauses.  See, e.g., Karen B. Satterleee & Kerry L. 
Bundy, ―You Made Me Do It‖: Reliance in Franchise Fraud Cases, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 191, 193 
(2007) (referring to a clause stating that no representations other than or inconsistent with the matters 
set forth in the contract were made as a ―no representation‖ clause).  
49. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 180 (Tex. 1997) (quoting from 
contract); see also, e.g., Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2000) (―The parties further 
declare that they have not relied upon any representation of any party hereby released [Defendant] or 
of their attorneys . . . , agents, or other representatives concerning the nature or extent of their 
respective injuries or damages. . . .  [T]his Agreement is executed by [Plaintiff] freely and 
voluntarily, and without reliance upon any statement or representation by Purchaser, the Company, 
any of the Affiliates or [Defendant] or any of their attorneys or agents except as set forth herein.‖ 
(quoting from contract)).  In this formulation, it is easier to understand why such clauses are 
frequently referred to as ―no-reliance clauses.‖ 
50. This Article does not address the potential application of the economic loss doctrine to bar 
fraudulent inducement claims.  Essentially, the economic loss doctrine is a judicially created rule that 
bars recovery in tort for strictly economic losses arising from a contractual relationship.  See, e.g., 
Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 670–81 (3d Cir. 2002) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); 
Palmetto Linen Serv., Inc. v. U.N.X., Inc., 205 F.3d 126, 128–30 (4th Cir. 2000) (interpreting South 
Carolina law); Cyberco Holdings, Inc. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 
2426(DC), 2002 WL 31324028, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2002) (interpreting Michigan law); 
Orlando v. Novurania of Am., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 220, 225–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (interpreting New 
York law); Eye Care Int‘l, Inc. v. Underhill, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314–15 (M.D. Fla. 2000) 
(interpreting Florida law); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 10–11 (Utah 2003) 
(interpreting Wyoming law). 
 Because of the sheer volume of litigation involving not only allegations of intentional fraud but 
also negligent and innocent misrepresentations, personal injuries, and property injuries arising from 
contractual relationships, the economic loss doctrine has a great deal of practical significance, 
making it a continuing topic of interest to lawyers, businesses, and judges.  See, e.g., Paul J. Schwiep, 
The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial Torts , 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 
(1995) (―[I]t is clear that judges, lawyers, and commercial clients alike are all desperately struggling 
to define the parameters of the economic loss doctrine.‖).  Despite this interest, however, the doctrine 
remains notoriously amorphous. See, e.g., Eddward P. Ballinger, Jr. & Samuel A. Thumma, The 
History, Evolution and Implications of Arizona’s Economic Loss Rule , 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491, 491 
(2002) (―The intersection between contract and tort law has confounded courts and counsel for 
decades.‖); R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic 
Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1789 
(2000) (―The economic loss rule is one of the most confusing doctrines in tort law.‖).  
Notwithstanding the doctrine‘s importance, however, this Article avoids any detailed examination of 
the doctrine because most courts find that ―fraud is an intentional tort, and as such, the intentional 
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[A] suit for fraud can be a device for trying to get around the 
limitations that the parol evidence rule and contract 
integration clauses place on efforts to vary a written contract 
on the basis of oral statements made in the negotiation phase. 
. . .  No-reliance clauses serve a legitimate purpose in closing 
a loophole in contract law (thus resisting, in Judge Kozinski‘s 
colorful expression, the metastasizing of contract law into tort 
law).
51
 
 
Courts faced with no-reliance clauses, however, have not responded 
uniformly.
52
  In fact, a survey of cases reveals that the decisions fall into three 
basic categories.
53
  First, a number of courts (in Category I) simply refuse to 
enforce such clauses.  Second, others (in Category II) may enforce the 
clauses, but only subject to significant restrictions.  For instance, some courts 
will enforce no-reliance clauses only if the seller can establish that the clauses 
were specifically negotiated—in other words, that the clauses are not 
boilerplate.
54
  Similarly, some courts will enforce only no-reliance clauses that 
are formalistically distinct from general merger clauses.  Other courts may 
enforce such clauses only if the seller can establish that they address with 
particularity the very type of factual representation on which the buyer claims 
to be relying.
55
  Still other courts will allow the no-reliance clause to be 
considered by the trier of fact only as evidence of the reasonableness of the 
buyer‘s reliance in the particular circumstances of the case.56  Finally, a 
growing number of courts (in Category III) seem to be enforcing no-reliance 
clauses to bar claims of fraudulent inducement as a matter of law.
57
 
 
misrepresentation is actionable as a tort, notwithstanding that the contract losses are solely 
economic.‖  Ralph C. Anzivino, The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 921, 922 (2007). 
51. Extra Equipamentos e Exportação, Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted). 
52. E.g., Steven M. Haas, Contracting Around Fraud Under Delaware Law, 10 DEL. L. REV. 
49, 51 (2008) (―Other jurisdictions have split on the treatment of extra-contractual disclaimers.‖). 
53. See infra Part II.A–C. 
54. See, e.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598–99 (N.Y. 1959). 
55. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 316–18 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(―[W]here specificity has been lacking, dismissal of [a] fraud claim has been ruled inappropriate[, 
and] . . . [w]here [a] fraud claim has been dismissed, the disclaimer has been sufficiently specific to 
match the alleged fraud.‖). 
56. See, e.g., Nutrasep, LLC v. TOPC Tex. LLC, No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL 3063432, at 
*8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006) (noting that the specificity of a no-reliance clause‘s language may shed 
light on a jury‘s consideration of the defendant‘s claims of reliance).  
57. See cases discussed infra Part II.C. 
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A. Category I: Courts Categorically Refusing to Enforce No-Reliance 
Clauses 
Traditionally, courts refused to enforce no-reliance clauses.
58
 As the New 
York Court of Appeals explained at the turn of the twentieth century in 
Bridger v. Goldsmith: 
 
[T]here is no authority that we are required to follow in 
support of the proposition that a party who has perpetrated a 
fraud upon his neighbor may nevertheless contract with him, 
in the very instrument by means of which it was perpetrated, 
for immunity against its consequences, close his mouth from 
complaining of it, and bind him never to seek redress. Public 
policy and morality are both ignored if such an agreement can 
be given effect in a court of justice. The maxim that fraud 
vitiates every transaction would no longer be the rule, but the 
exception. It could be applied then only in such case as the 
guilty party neglected to protect himself from his fraud by 
means of such a stipulation. Such a principle would in a short 
time break down every barrier which the law has erected 
against fraudulent dealing.
59
 
 
An early Minnesota Supreme Court case, Ganley Bros. v. Butler Bros. 
Building Co.,
60
 serves as a prime example of this jurisprudential approach to 
no-reliance clauses.  In Ganley, a defendant general contractor engaged the 
services of the plaintiff subcontractor for the construction of roads.
61
  The 
plaintiff alleged that it was induced into the contracts by the defendant‘s 
fraud.
62
  The defendant countered by pointing to a no-reliance provision in the 
contract that, even by the most exacting standards, would seem to disclaim 
responsibility for precontractual misrepresentations by the defendant: 
 
The contractor has examined the said contracts of December 
7, 1922, and the specifications and plans forming a part 
 
58. ―Should a person escape liability for his own fraudulent statements by inserting in a 
contract a clause to the effect that the other party shall not rely upon them?  Most courts throughout 
this country and in England have replied to this question in the negative.‖  Richard T. Rosen, 
Comment, Disclaimer of Liability for Fraud in Written Agreements, 24 ALB. L. REV. 148, 148 (1960) 
(footnote omitted); see also Recent Decision, Contracts—Stipulation Against Effect of Fraud, 25 
COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231 (1925) (―[N]o agreement of the parties can preclude the defense of 
fraud.‖). 
59. 38 N.E. 458, 459 (N.Y. 1894). 
60. 212 N.W. 602 (Minn. 1927). 
61. Id. at 602. 
62. Id. 
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thereof, and is familiar with the location of said work and the 
conditions under which the same must be performed, and 
knows all the requirements, and is not relying upon any 
statement made by the company in respect thereto. The 
contractor further represents that it is familiar with the kind 
and character of the work to be done, as called for by said 
plans, specifications, and contract, and that it is experienced 
in road building.
63
 
 
In the defendant‘s view, this disclaimer should have been enforced because ―a 
party should have the legal right to let his work to a certain person because the 
other will therein agree that he relies and acts only upon his own knowledge 
and not upon the representations of his adversary.‖64  Although the court 
agreed, in theory, with this freedom-of-contract notion—a contracting party, 
the court conceded, ―should have this right‖65—it could come up with no 
legitimate reason why the right would ever need to be invoked.
66
  Without a 
legitimate justification for the no-reliance clause, the court concluded that 
―[t]he law should not, and does not, permit a covenant of immunity to be 
drawn that will protect a person against his own fraud. . . .  Fraud destroys all 
consent.‖67 
In the same year that the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Ganley, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision invoking a strikingly 
similar line of reasoning in Arnold v. National Aniline & Chemical Co.
68
  
Although the court in Arnold ultimately concluded that the clause at issue did 
not ―purport to exclude causes of action for fraud‖69 and thus could not suffice 
to disclaim fraud in the inducement, it discussed the enforceability of no-
reliance clauses at some length.
70
  This discussion reveals a fervent skepticism 
of such clauses, even though it also suggests, as did the discussion in Ganley, 
that a few courts, at the time, were exploring the possibility of enforcing these 
clauses in the name of freedom of contract.
71
  Notwithstanding the general 
 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 603. 
65. Id. 
66. See id.  The court did note that it might ―be desirable in dealing with unscrupulous persons 
to have [a no-reliance] clause as a shield against wrongful charges of fraud.‖  Id.  But in the court‘s 
view, ―if there is no fraud that fact will be established on the trial,‖ and ―every party should have his 
day in court.‖  Id. 
67. Id. 
68. 20 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1927). 
69. Id. at 369. 
70. Id. at 368–69. 
71. Id. at 369 (citing several Massachusetts cases for the proposition that ―where one declares 
in his contract that every representation to which he will undertake to hold the opposite party is 
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strength of freedom-of-contract principles, however, according to the Second 
Circuit, the decisions refusing to enforce no-reliance clauses were superior 
because they were ―based upon a greater consideration for the individual who 
may suffer wrong through deliberate fraud.‖72 
The traditional and categorical approach to the enforceability of no-
reliance clauses embodied in cases like Bridger, Ganley, and Arnold still 
captures the attention of some modern courts.  For instance, according to the 
California Court of Appeals, 
 
[a] party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud in its 
inducement cannot absolve himself [or herself] from the 
effects of his [or her] fraud by any stipulation in the contract, 
either that no representations have been made, or that any 
right which might be grounded upon them is waived.
73
 
 
Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court has declared that ―Tennessee law 
‗gives no effect to disclaimers in the presence of fraud,‘‖74 and the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that ―‗[t]he law does not permit a covenant of 
immunity which will protect a person against his own fraud on the ground of 
public policy.‘‖75 
 
embodied in the agreement, no fraud which does not enter into the execution [as opposed to 
inducement] of the contract can avail either as a defense or as ground for an independent action‖). 
72. Id. 
73. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 
788 n.7 (1995) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Simmons v. Ratterree Land Co., 17 P.2d 727, 728 
(Cal. 1932) (―A seller cannot escape liability for his own fraud or false representations by the 
insertion of provisions such as are embodied in the contract of sale herein.‖). 
74. First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Brooks Farms, 821 S.W.2d 925, 928  (Tenn. 1991) (quoting 
Agristor Leasing v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods. Inc., 869 F.2d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1989)); see also 
In re Sikes, 184 B.R. 742, 746 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995) (―Tennessee . . . does not permit 
disclaimers of liability or exculpatory clauses to excuse a party from fraud.‖); Robinson v. Tate, 236 
S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (―We think citation of authority is unnecessary for the 
statement that one may not contract against liability for fraud.‖). 
75. Ong Int‘l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993) (quoting Lamb 
v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974)).  Other states follow suit.  See, e.g., Nw. Bank and Trust 
Co. v. First Ill. Nat‘l Bank, 354 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 2003) (―Under Iowa law, contractual 
disclaimers are ineffective to bar a plaintiff from asserting a claim for fraudulent inducement.‖ (citing 
Hall v. Crow, 34 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Iowa 1948) (―[W]here there is evidence of fraudulent 
misrepresentations in the inception of a contract such misrepresentations can be the basis for either 
an action to rescind or for damages, despite the limiting provisions of a contract.‖))); Turkish v. 
Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 27–28 (2d Cir. 1994) (―We could not uphold any provision intended to insulate 
parties from their own fraud.  It is well settled that parties cannot use contractual limitation of 
liability clauses to shield themselves from liability for their own fraudulent conduct.‖); RepublicBank 
Dallas, N.A. v. First Wis. Nat‘l Bank of Milwaukee, 636 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (E.D. Wis. 1986) 
(―There is ample Wisconsin caselaw in which [courts have held] disclaimers of liability ineffective 
against claims of fraudulent misrepresentation.‖ (citing Malas v. Lounsbury, 214 N.W. 332, 333 
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Even the Restatement (Second) of Contracts declares that ―[a] term 
unreasonably exempting a party from the legal consequences of a 
misrepresentation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.‖76 So, as 
Illustration 1 says, if ―A and B sign a written agreement containing a term 
precluding B from asserting any misrepresentations made by A[,] [t]he term is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy with respect to both fraudulent and 
 
(Wis. 1927) (―An express agreement made in a contract that it shall be incontestable for fraud is void 
as against public policy.‖))); Oak Indus., Inc. v. Foxboro Co., 596 F. Supp. 601, 607 (S.D. Cal. 1984) 
(recognizing that under California law the general rule is that, notwithstanding no-representation 
clauses, extrinsic evidence of fraud may be used to prove fraud in the inducement); Sperau v. Ford 
Motor Co., 674 So. 2d 24, 35–36 (Ala. 1995), vacated and remanded, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996), aff’d 
subject to remittitur of punitive damages 708 So. 2d 111, 124 (1997) (allowing plaintiffs to prove 
that defendants had misrepresented the profitability of a franchise notwithstanding a written 
contractual provision that no representations had been made regarding profitability, because ―‗[t]o  
refuse relief [on grounds of the disclaimer] would result in a multitude of frauds and in thwarting the 
general policy of the law‘‖ (citation omitted)); Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195, 200 (Ala. 1990) 
(holding that ―releases as to future intentional [torts are] prohibited‖); Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 
So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (―‗Fraud is an intentional tort and thus not subject to the 
cathartic effect of the exculpatory clauses found in contracts.‘‖ (quoting L. Luria & Son, Inc. v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984))); Robinson v. Perpetual Servs. 
Corp., 412 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Iowa 1987) (reaffirming the principle laid down in Hall); Miles 
Excavating, Inc. v. Rutledge Backhoe & Septic Tank Servs., Inc., 927 P.2d 517, 518 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1996) (―We hold that parol evidence is admissible to show fraud in the inducement of a contract even 
where the contract contains a provision stating the parties have not relied on any representations 
other than those contained in the writing.‖); Bryant v. Troutman, 287 S.W.2d 918, 920–21 (Ky. 
1956) (―One cannot contract against his fraud.‖); McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Norton Co., 563 
N.E.2d 188, 194 (Mass. 1990) (―We continue to believe that parties to contracts, whether 
experienced in business or not, should deal with each other honestly, and that a party should not be 
permitted to engage in fraud to induce the contract.‖); Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551, 555 (Mass. 
1941) (noting in a fraud case involving a contract providing that defendant made no representations 
that ―[a]ttempts under the form of contract to secure total or partial immunity from liability for fraud 
are all under the ban of the law‖ (citation and quotation omitted)); Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage., Inc., 
518 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Neb. 1994) (―Citicorp cannot escape liability for the fraudulent conduct of its 
agent on the sole basis that it included a disclaimer clause in the purchase agreement.‖); Niehaus v. 
Haven Park West, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (―‗Fraud which enters into the 
actual making of a contract cannot be excluded from the reach of the law by any formal phrase 
inserted in the contract itself.‘‖ (citation omitted)); Carty v. McMenamin, 216 P. 228, 230–31 (Or. 
1923) (noting in a case involving a contractual provision stating that defendants made no 
representation about the subject of the fraud that ―[i]f a party is guilty of fraud in making a contract, 
he cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his own wrong by a provision in writing that 
his fraudulent oral representations shall not be used as evidence against him in a case in which fraud 
and deceit is the gist of the cause‖); Dieterich v. Rice, 197 P. 1, 3 (Wash. 1921) (stating that a 
contractual provision wherein plaintiff represented that he had not relied on any sayings or 
inducements by defendant was worth no more than a piece of waste paper in a fraud case); Baylies v. 
Vanden Boom, 278 P. 551, 553–54, 557 (Wyo. 1929) (giving no efficacy to a contractual provision 
stating that plaintiff relied on no statements by defendant not contained in the writing). 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (1981).  Comment a goes on to specifically 
contemplate the use of no-reliance clauses that effectively ―prevent[] reliance by the recipient on a 
misrepresentation (see § 167) or that make[] reliance unjustified (see § 172).‖  Id. cmt. a. 
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non-fraudulent misrepresentations.‖77  Despite the crisp clarity of the 
illustration example, however, on its face the Restatement‘s use of the 
qualifier ―unreasonably‖ seems to raise at least the possibility that a no-
reliance clause could be enforced in some limited—not unreasonable—
circumstances.
78
  As the next section discusses, some courts agree and may 
enforce no-reliance clauses, but only subject to significant restrictions. 
B. Category II: Courts Enforcing No-Reliance Clauses, but Only Subject to 
Significant Limitations 
Although, as the Second Circuit noted in Arnold v. National Aniline and 
Chemical Co., some courts before the middle of the twentieth century 
occasionally enforced or considered enforcing no-reliance clauses,
79
 it was not 
until the New York Court of Appeals decided Danann Realty Corp. v. 
Harris
80
 in 1959 that no-reliance clause jurisprudence began to change in a 
demonstrable fashion.
81
  In Danann, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants 
had induced him to buy the lease of a building by making false oral 
representations about the operating expenses of the building and its overall 
profitability.
82
  The written agreement between the parties, however, 
contained a no-reliance clause stating that the defendants had not made any 
representations ―as to the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses, operation 
or any other matter or thing affecting or related to the aforesaid premises.‖83  
The agreement went on to provide that ―neither party [was] relying upon any 
statement or representation, not embodied in this contract, made by the 
other.‖84  Although the majority noted that a general and vague merger clause 
would not bar parol evidence to support a fraud claim,
85
 it found that the 
contract‘s specific disclaimer of reliance on the very types of representations 
 
77. Id. cmt. a, illus. 1. 
78. Some courts citing section 196 seem to find that all purported disclaimers of intentional 
fraud are per se ―unreasonable.‖  See, e.g., Merzin v. Provident Fin. Group, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 
674, 685 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (―[I]t seems inequitable to permit a party to eliminate liability for an 
alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by drafting such a term.‖); Blankenheim v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 
266 Cal. Rptr. 593, 599 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (―The Restatement 2d of Contracts and the modern 
trend are in accord: there can be no exemption from liability for any misrepresentation.‖ (emphasis 
omitted)).  Presumably, in the view of these courts, section 196 allows only reasonable no-reliance-
type clauses to exempt parties from the consequences of unintentional misrepresentations. 
79. 20 F.2d 364, 369 (2d. Cir. 1927). 
80. 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959). 
81. See id. at 602 (Fuld, J., dissenting) (asserting that, prior to the majority‘s decision, ―it 
matter[ed] not‖ whether the no-reliance clause was general, specific, or even precise to the fraudulent 
allegations because they were not enforceable). 
82. Id. at 598. 
83. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
84. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
85. Id. 
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that constituted the alleged fraud prevented the plaintiff from claiming that it 
had justifiably relied on any fraudulent pre-contractual misrepresentations.
86
 
Following Danann, other courts applying New York law have allowed 
enforcement of no-reliance clauses only if the defendant can show that the 
clauses were specifically negotiated (nonboilerplate) and particularly set out 
the precise representations at issue.
87
  For instance, in Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust Co. v. Yanakas,
88
 the Second Circuit held that a no-reliance clause was 
not enforceable because the clause did ―not, in words or substance, contain 
disclaimers of the representations that formed the basis of [the plaintiff‘s] 
claim of fraudulent inducement.‖89  Many of the courts following Danann, 
however, have ―ratcheted up‖ the degree of proof required to establish that a 
provision is not boilerplate and have tightened the required degree of 
specificity needed to disclaim representations.
90
 
Similarly, some courts outside of New York, following the basic precepts 
of Danann, have imposed even more stringent limitations on the 
enforceability of no-reliance clauses.  Two recent cases applying Texas law, 
Warehouse Associates Corp. Centre II, Inc. v. Celotex Corp.
91
 and Nutrasep, 
LLC v. TOPC Texas LLC,
92
 demonstrate just how stringent these requirements 
can be. 
 
86. Id. at 600. 
87. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(―The venerable principles established in Danann remain the law of New York State.‖); Grumman 
Allied Indus., Inc. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 735 (2d. Cir. 1984) (―The Danann rule operates 
where the substance of the disclaimer provisions tracks the substance of the alleged 
misrepresentations.‖). 
88. 7 F.3d 310, 316–18 (2d Cir. 1993) (reinstating a fraud claim and holding that no-reliance 
clauses can only be upheld if they are specifically negotiated, nonboilerplate, provisions that address, 
with particularity, the representations at issue). 
89. Id. at 318. 
90. See, e.g., Zaro Bake Shop, Inc. v. David, 574 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (App. Div. 1991) (finding 
that ―although the guarantee provided that the [defendants] were ‗absolutely and unconditionally‘ 
liable on the note, such language, in and of itself, was . . . insufficient to preclude the [defendants] 
from introducing proof of fraud in the inducement‖); DiFilippo v. Hidden Ponds Assocs., 537 
N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (App. Div. 1989) (stating that a contract provision was not a bar to fraud-in-
inducement claim where it ―d[id] not specifically disclaim reliance on any oral representation 
concerning the particular matter as to which plaintiff now claims he was defrauded‖); GTE 
Automatic Electric Inc. v. Martin‘s Inc., 512 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (App. Div. 1987) (finding that a 
recitation that underlying notes are absolute and unconditional does not bar proof of fraud in 
inducement of the guarantee since there was ―not . . . a specific disclaimer, as in . . . Danann Realty 
and, therefore, the principle of [that case] does not apply‖); Goodridge v. Fernandez, 505 N.Y.S.2d 
144, 147 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that the defendant was not barred from asserting fraud-in-
inducement defense because, ―in sharp contrast to the guarantee in [another case], [the defendant‘s 
guarantee] contains no specific disclaimer of defenses available to the guarantor with [respect] to the 
guaranty‖). 
91. 192 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
92. No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL 3063432 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006). 
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Celotex arose out of a dispute over the sale of property. The defendant 
seller had ―operated an asphalt shingle manufacturing plant on the Property 
for a number of years‖ prior to entering into the contract to sell it to the 
plaintiff.
93
  While negotiating the sale, the defendant provided the plaintiff 
with a partial environmental report indicating that asbestos had been used in 
the buildings on the property but omitting information about asbestos 
contamination in the soil and the use of asbestos in the shingle manufacturing 
process.
94
  The defendant then discovered asbestos in the soil but did not 
disclose this finding to the plaintiff, who conducted an independent 
environmental assessment of the soil.
95
  After the inspection period and 
closing, the plaintiff discovered significant asbestos contamination in the soil 
and brought suit against the defendant, alleging fraud and misrepresentation.
96
 
The sale contract included an extensive ―waiver-of-reliance‖ provision 
providing, for example, that: 
 
Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that seller has not made, 
does not make and specifically disclaims any representations, 
warranties, promises, covenants, agreements or guaranties of 
any kind or character whatsoever, whether express or implied, 
oral or written, past, present or future, of, as to, concerning or 
with respect to (A) the nature, quality or condition of the 
property, including without limitation, the water, soil and 
geology, (B) the income to be derived from the property, (C) 
the suitability of the property for any and all activities and 
uses which Purchaser may conduct thereon[.]
97
 
 
Considering that this disclaimer seemed to address precisely the very sort of 
matter allegedly creating the fraud, the defendant argued that the plaintiff‘s 
fraud claims should be barred by it.
98
 
After reviewing prior Texas precedent,
99
 the court in Celotex determined 
that a carefully negotiated no-reliance clause was not necessarily enforceable: 
―an arm‘s length transaction between parties represented by counsel is not 
 
93. Celotex, 192 S.W.3d at 227. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 228. 
96. Id. at 228–29. 
97. Id. at 235. 
98. Id. at 234–35. 
99. Primarily, the court focused on a close analysis of Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. 
Swanson, a decision that was self-consciously fact-specific.  959 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Tex. 1997) (―We 
conclude only that on this record, the disclaimer of reliance conclusively negates as a matter of law 
the element of reliance on representations . . . needed to support the [plaintiff‘s]  claim of fraudulent 
inducement.‖). 
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enough to enforce a waiver-of-reliance clause.‖100  Additionally, the court 
determined that the specificity in the no-reliance clause was insufficient, even 
if coupled with the fact that the clause was carefully negotiated, to make the 
clause enforceable.
101
  Instead, in the court‘s estimation, an additional 
circumstance must be proven before a no-reliance clause will be enforced to 
bar fraudulent inducement claims: the fraud must induce a party to sign a 
release or settlement agreement intended to definitively resolve a long-
running dispute between the parties.
102
 
The court in Nutrasep followed essentially the same analysis as the court 
in Celotex and reached a very similar result.  The dispute in Nutrasep 
involved a Technology Licensing Agreement and a Manufacturing and 
Supply Agreement.
103
  Nutrasep, LLC (NTS) purported to have developed a 
system for improving the quality of soybean oil, which it licensed to TOPC.
104
  
TOPC was an agricultural cooperative that produced soybean oil.
105
  NTS 
sued TOPC for breach of the Technology License Agreement and the 
Manufacturing and Supply Agreement, based on TOPC‘s failure to make the 
required payments.
106
  TOPC argued, in response, that NTS had 
misrepresented the uniqueness of NTS‘s technology and the amount of 
investment that TOPC would be required to make.
107
  In a motion for 
summary judgment, NTS asserted that these fraud counterclaims should fail 
as a matter of law because of a no-reliance clause, providing in pertinent part 
that: 
 
[TOPC], by execution hereof, acknowledges, covenants and 
agrees that it has not been induced in any way by NTS or its 
employees to enter into this Agreement, and further warrants 
and represents that (i) it has conducted sufficient due 
diligence with respect to all items and issues pertaining to this 
Article 3 and all other matters pertaining to this Agreement; 
and (ii) [TOPC] has adequate knowledge and expertise, or has 
utilized knowledgeable and expert consultants, to adequately 
conduct the due diligence, and agrees to accept all risks 
inherent herein. . . .  This Agreement constitutes the entire 
and only agreement between the parties for Licensed Subject 
 
100. 192 S.W.3d at 233. 
101. Id. at 234. 
102. Id. 
103. Nutrasep, LLC v. TOPC Tex. LLC, No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL 3063432, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at *2. 
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Matter and all other prior negotiations, representations, 
agreements, and understandings are superseded hereby.  No 
agreements altering or supplementing the terms hereof may 
be made except by a written document signed by both 
parties.
108
 
 
Following the Celotex court‘s lead, the court in Nutrasep concluded that 
these no-reliance provisions were not necessarily dispositive of the fraud 
claim.
109
  First, NTS and TOPC ―entered into the Agreements in order to 
create a business relationship, not end an existing one [and resolve a dispute 
between the parties].‖110 Second, TOPC was not represented by counsel, and 
the provisions were ―standard boiler-plate provisions that do not clearly and 
unequivocally disclaim reliance on the specific representations that form the 
basis for [TOPC‘s] fraud claims.‖111  Accordingly, the court denied NTS‘s 
motion for summary judgment on TOPC‘s fraud claims.112  The court did 
note, however, that ―given the language of the various clauses, a jury may 
well find [TOPC‘s] professions of reliance on [NTS‘s] statements lacking in 
credibility.‖113 
Cases like Celotex and Nutrasep, in short, demonstrate an approach that 
has emerged since Danann in which some courts enforce no-reliance clauses, 
but only somewhat grudgingly and subject to strict limitations.
114
  As the next 
 
108. Id. at *6. 
109. Id. at *8. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id.  Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that no-reliance clauses may 
only be considered as evidence relevant to determining whether the allegedly defrauded party 
reasonably relied on the representation at issue.  See, e.g., Kaufman v. Guest Capital, LLC, 386 F. 
Supp. 2d 256, 268 (2005) (―[T]he Court deems it imprudent to examine the non-reliance clauses in 
an abstract fashion without delving further into the undisputed facts regarding [the alleged fraud].‖). 
114. See, e.g., Dunbar Med. Sys., Inc. v. Gammex Inc., 216 F.3d 441, 450–51 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(applying Texas law to hold that a ―sold as is‖ clause coupled with a clause providing that no other 
oral representations had been made did not prevent plaintiff from proving defendant‘s fraud); Deluxe 
Media Servs., LLC v. Direct Disc Network, Inc., No. 06 C 1666, 2007 WL 707544, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 2, 2007) (effectively endorsing the specificity requirement of Yanakas); Becker v. Allcom, Inc., 
No. C04-0958L, 2005 WL 1654524, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 2005) (―[T]he fact that an 
agreement includes a non-reliance provision is relevant but not dispositive of whether reliance on 
outside representations was reasonable.‖); DynCorp v. GTE Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 308, 319 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (―Dyncorp‘s particularized disclaimers [that extra-contractual representation that 
were made were not being relied upon] make it impossible for it to prove one of the elements of a 
claim of fraud: that it reasonably relied on the representations that it alleges were made to induce it to 
enter into the Purchase Agreement.‖); In re Hovis, 325 B.R. 158, 167 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2005) (finding 
that fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims did not fail as a matter of law in the face of a non-
reliance clause, but noting that such clauses could raise a doubt about whether reasonable reliance 
existed); Slack v. James, 614 S.E.2d 636, 640–41 (S.C. 2005) (finding that a clause providing that 
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section observes, only a few courts have pressed beyond the strictures of post-
Danann reasoning to find that no-reliance clauses may be enforced without 
restrictions. 
C. Category III: Courts Enforcing No-Reliance Clauses Without Significant 
Limitations 
A few courts freely give effect to no-reliance clauses
115
 or strongly 
suggest that they will do so.
116
  At the avant-garde are the Delaware courts (or 
courts applying Delaware law).  Although the Delaware Supreme Court 
technically remains wary of no-reliance clauses,
117
 the clear trend in Delaware 
is evidenced by the Abry court‘s bold assertion about the clarity of Delaware‘s 
no-reliance clause jurisprudence: 
 
We have honored clauses in which contracted parties have 
disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual representations, 
which prohibits the promising party from reneging on its 
promise by premising a fraudulent inducement claim on 
 
both parties ―acknowledge that they have not received or relied upon any statements or 
representations by either Broker or their agents which are not expressly stipulated herein‖ was 
merely a general merger clause and insufficient to preclude a fraud-in-the-inducement claim 
(emphasis omitted)); Stewart v. Estate of Steiner, 93 P.3d 919, 927 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing 
a no-reliance clause to stand but only considering it as a factor that could be weighed by a trier of 
fact in determining whether the plaintiff‘s reliance was reasonable under the circumstances).  
115. Of course, such clauses are always subject to the same restrictions and limitations as any 
other contract provisions. 
116. See, e.g., MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting New York‘s particularity rule and upholding a no-reliance clause); Garcia v. Santa Maria 
Resort, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff 
could not maintain a fraud claim against the defendant in the face of an express no-reliance clause); 
Eclipse Med., Inc. v. Am. Hydro-Surgical Instruments, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 
1999)  (―[R]eliance on fraudulent representations is unreasonable as a matter of law where the 
alleged misrepresentations contradict the express terms of the ensuing written agreement.‖); H-M 
Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 142 n.18 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating in dicta that ―[t]he 
Court of Chancery has consistently held that sophisticated parties to negotiated commercial contracts 
may not reasonably rely on information that they contractually agreed did not form a part of the basis 
for their decision to contract‖ (citation omitted)). 
117. See Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 1982).  In Norton, the plaintiff buyer sought to 
rescind a real estate transaction by alleging that the seller had negligently misrepresented the land‘s 
zoning.  Id.  The purchase agreement contained a no-reliance clause stating that ―Purchasers and 
Sellers agree that they have read and fully understand this contract & furthermore they acknowledge 
that they do not rely on any written or oral representations not expressly written in this contract.‖  Id. 
at 3.  In response to the seller‘s effort to defeat the buyer‘s claims using this clause, the De laware 
Supreme Court declared that such a clause ―does not preclude a claim based upon fraudulent 
misrepresentations.‖  Id. at 6. 
2009] ENFORCEABILITY OF NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES 449 
statements of fact it had previously said were neither made to 
it nor had an effect on it.
118
 
 
A recent case by the Third Circuit applying Delaware law, MBIA 
Insurance Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,
119
 illustrates this trend.  In MBIA, the 
court upheld the enforceability of a no-reliance clause despite the fact that the 
contract (or more precisely a series of insurance contracts) had been obtained 
as a result of a ―spectacular fraud.‖120  Because ―[t]he Delaware Supreme 
Court ha[d] not addressed the standards for effective waiver of a defense 
based on fraud in the inducement,‖ the Third Circuit had to predict how the 
Delaware Supreme Court would rule on this issue.
121
  Although previous 
Delaware precedent appeared to indicate that Delaware courts would follow 
the New York approach and require that enforceable no-reliance clauses 
appear outside of mere boilerplate provisions,
122
 the Third Circuit effectively 
eviscerated this requirement.  In weighing the degree of comprehensiveness 
and detail in no-reliance clauses in the insurance policies at issue, the court 
concluded that ―[t]he lack of specificity in [the issuer‘s] waivers does not 
make them any less clear.‖123  The court went on to say that: 
 
[g]iven the potential for misrepresentation from each side of 
the agreement, the safer route is to leave parties that can 
protect themselves to their own devices, enforcing the 
agreement they actually fashion.  This rule will make for less 
prolix disclaimers and reduce the likelihood that an intended 
allocation of the risk of fraud will be frustrated by an 
unintentional omission from a long and tedious list of 
representations. . . . When sophisticated parties include a 
broad but unambiguous anti-reliance clause in their 
agreement, the Delaware Supreme Court will likely indulge 
 
118. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1057 (Del. Ch. 2006) 
(stating in dicta that ―a party cannot promise, in a clear integration clause of a negot iated agreement, 
that it will not rely on promises and representations outside of the agreement and then shirk its own 
bargain in favor of a ‗but we did rely on those other representations‘ fraudulent inducement claim‖). 
119. 426 F.3d 204. 
120. Id. at 208. 
121. Id. at 214. 
122. See In re Med. Wind Down Holdings III, Inc., 332 B.R. 98, 104  (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) 
(―‗[B]ecause Delaware‘s public policy is intolerant of fraud, the intent to preclude reliance on extra-
contractual statements must emerge clearly and unambiguously from the contract.‘‖ (quoting 
Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004))); Norton, 443 A.2d at 7 (―We see no reason 
why a court of equity should enforce a standard ‗boiler plate‘ provision that would permit one who 
makes a material misrepresentation to retain the benefit resulting from that misrepresentation at the 
expense of an innocent party.‖). 
123. MBIA Ins. Corp., 426 F.3d at 218. 
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the assumption that they said what they meant and meant 
what they said.
124
 
 
Cases like MBIA, however, are unusual.  Most of the decisions surveyed 
either refuse to enforce no-reliance clauses or will enforce such clauses only 
subject to a number of limitations or restrictions.  As the next Part argues, 
courts skeptical of no-reliance clauses seem to rest their judgments on moral 
prohibitions against lying.  Giving at best cursory attention to generic notions 
of freedom of contract, these courts presume that parties have gained no 
legitimate value from no-reliance clauses. 
III. ―DESIGNS AND ARTIFICES OF THE CRAFTY‖: THE GENERIC MORAL 
THEORIES RELIED ON BY COURTS RELUCTANT TO ENFORCE NO-RELIANCE 
CLAUSES 
An action for fraud, it has been said, serves to protect ―the weak and the 
ignorant against the designs and artifices of the crafty.‖125  In the context of 
precontractual negotiations, fraud may consist of an intentional 
misrepresentation about the character or quality of performance, dissimulation 
about the likelihood of performance, or both.  Misrepresentations of the first 
kind lead promisees to enter into contracts that they otherwise might avoid by 
convincing them that the promised performance will be more valuable than it 
actually is.  Misrepresentations of the second kind, in contrast, lead promisees 
to enter into contracts that they might otherwise avoid by convincing them 
that the promisor has a greater intent or ability to perform than he actually 
does.  This second kind of misrepresentation hinges on the recognition that 
―the state of a man‘s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.‖126  
In other words, ―[b]y saying something about the promisor‘s present intent [to 
perform], the act of promising creates the opportunity to lie.‖127 
Because fraud is a ―‗protean legal concept, assuming many shapes and 
forms,‘‖128 courts tend to be particularly solicitous of alleged victims of 
 
124. Id. 
125. Medbury v. Watson, 47 Mass. (6 Met.) 246, 259 (1843). 
126. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (Ch. App. 1885). 
127. IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED 
INTENT 4 (2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. c (1977) (―A 
representation of the state of mind of the maker or of a third person is a misrepresentation if the state 
of mind in question is otherwise than as represented.  Thus, a statement that a particular person, 
whether the maker of the statement or a third person, is of a particular opinion or has a particular 
intention is a misrepresentation if the person in question does not hold the opinion or have the 
intention asserted.‖). 
128. Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. 1986) (quoting Jacobs v. Farmland 
Mut. Ins. Co., 377 N.W.2d 441, 444 n.1 (Minn. 1985)); see also, e.g., Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 
108, 114 (Mo. 1913) (―Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite.  Fraud being infinite and taking on protean 
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fraudulent representations.  As the previous section demonstrates, in the 
context of no-reliance clauses, this solicitude means that a significant number 
of courts remain wary of enforcing no-reliance clauses.  Some (Category I 
courts) simply will not do so under any circumstances.  Others (Category II 
courts) may enforce the clauses, but only subject to significant restrictions.  
Both categories of courts, I contend, rely, often only implicitly, on one of two 
generic moral theories to justify their conclusion that no-reliance clauses 
should not be enforced or should be enforced only with significant limitations.  
Specifically, courts either rely on deontological conceptions of the value of 
autonomy and the harm to autonomy caused by lying
129
 or consequentialist 
conceptions of the harm caused to the fabric of society as a whole by lying in 
contract negotiations.
130
 
The following two sections trace, in broad strokes, both arguments.  The 
goals of these sections are twofold.  First, I want to describe, sympathetically, 
the powerful, if only generic, concerns regarding fraud that seem to underlie 
courts‘ reluctance to enforce no-reliance clauses.  After all, ―[l]egal rules must 
be constructed and justified in ways that take into account the fact that law 
embodies a system of rules and practices that moral agents inhabit, enforce, 
and are subject to alongside other aspects of their lives, especially their moral 
 
form at will, were courts to cramp themselves by defining it with a hard and fast definition, their 
jurisdiction would be cunningly circumvented at once by new schemes beyond the defin ition.‖). 
129. Lying may be defined more narrowly than fraud, which in some jurisdictions includes 
more than intentional misrepresentations.  Indeed, a number of courts have devised various 
formulations that have ―stretched‖ the concept of scienter, allowing recovery for misstatements made 
with something less than an intent to deceive.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 740–42 (5th ed. 1984); see also, e.g., Leon Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. 
REV. 749, 752–57 (1930) (discussing various court formulas for meeting scienter requirements in 
fraud actions).  For example, some courts have imputed knowledge to the defendant, thereby 
concluding that the defendant ―knew‖ of the falsity of her statement.  KEETON ET AL., supra, § 107, 
at 740–42.  Other courts have allowed recovery for misstatements made ―recklessly.‖  See, e.g., 
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Flamme v. Wolf Ins. Agency, 476 
N.W.2d 802, 809 (Neb. 1991) (Shanahan, J., concurring).  Finally, most courts find that fraud may 
include omissions as well as express representations.  See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 184–
85 (1817) (―Suppression of material circumstances within the knowledge of the vendee, and not 
accessible to the vendor, is equivalent to fraud, and vitiates the contract.‖). 
 While there may be moral gradations between the various forms of deception that count as 
―fraud,‖ it seems beyond cavil that the most morally reprehensible form of deception is the outright 
lie.  Accordingly, moral prohibitions against fraud are at their strongest when the fraud involves a lie.  
For the purposes of this Article, then, I will limit myself to an examination of this strongest moral 
case against fraud. 
130. The basic framework tracks a distinction made by Alasdair MacIntyre between ―two rival 
moral traditions with respect to truth-telling and lying, one for which a lie is primarily an offense 
against trust and one for which it is primarily an offense against truth.‖ Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn from Mill and Kant? , in 16 THE 
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 336 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1995). 
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agency.‖131  It will not do to advance an argument in favor of the enforcement 
of no-reliance clauses without accounting for the moral intuition that such 
clauses violate fundamental precepts of morality and fairness.  Second, I want 
to demonstrate that neither deontological nor consequentialist conceptions of 
the wrongfulness of lying, with the exception of a rare brand of Kantianism, 
constitute categorical norms.  Instead, moral prohibitions against lying are, in 
the main, prophylactic in nature.  Accordingly, as I argue in the third section 
of this Part, even presuming that one or both conceptions have moral 
purchase, other first-order principles, like freedom of contract, can and should 
take priority in particular situations. 
Importantly, I do not make any strong claims in this section about whether 
freedom of contract should trump moral prohibitions against lying in the 
context of no-reliance clauses.  My goal is more modest.  I simply mean to 
establish that a comparison of first-order moral principles is needed.  To date, 
courts have not engaged in this comparison, relying instead on a faulty 
presumption that no-reliance clauses have no morally legitimate value to 
contracting parties. 
A. Deontological Rationales 
A lie is the statement, verbal or nonverbal, of a proposition that the 
speaker believes to be false, but that the speaker intends the listener to take as 
a proposition the speaker believes to be true.
132
  So defined, lying is widely 
condemned as wrong, and as a general matter, it is proscribed by the law, but 
opinions differ as to why.
133
  One of the most pervasive explanations for the 
wrongfulness of lying derives from Immanuel Kant. 
Kant had no patience for lies.  He stated that ―the greatest violation of 
man‘s duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in his 
own person) is the contrary of truthfulness, lying. . . .  [B]y a lie a man throws 
away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a man.‖134  He continued: 
 
131. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
708, 712 (2007). 
132. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts 
Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 159 (2002) (―Lying, 
as we shall see, involves asserting what one believes is literally false.‖). 
133. For an excellent discussion of the various legal responses to deception, see generally Alan 
Strudler, Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud , 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1529 (1998).  See also Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1035 
(2006) (―The public policy against fraud is a strong and venerable one that is largely founded on the 
societal consensus that lying is wrong.‖). 
134. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 225 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797) 
(emphasis omitted).  Augustine similarly regarded lies as wrong in principle.  See Saint Augustine, 
Lying, in 16 THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 45, 109 (Roy J. Deferrari ed., Sister Mary Sarah 
Muldowney et al. trans., 1952) (―Whoever thinks, moreover, that there is any kind of lie which is not 
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A [human being] who does not himself believe what he tells 
another . . . has even less worth than if he were a mere thing; 
for a thing because it is something real and given, has the 
property of being serviceable so that another can put it to 
some use. But communication of one‘s thoughts to someone 
through words that yet (intentionally) contain the contrary of 
what the speaker thinks on the subject is an end that is 
directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker‘s 
capacity to communicate his thoughts, and is thus a 
renunciation by the speaker of his personality, and such a 
speaker is a mere deceptive appearance of a [human being], 
not a [human being] him [or her] self.
135
 
 
Indeed, so strong were his views on lying that he believed even lies that were 
told with good intention were categorically wrong.
136
 
Neo-Kantians tend to agree that lying is an affront to autonomy.  Lies 
interfere with the victim‘s rational deliberation and rob the victim of her 
prospects for making at least some sensible choices about a course of action 
or belief.
137
  As Charles Fried has put it, lying is a breach of trust: 
 
Lying is wrong because when I lie I set up a relation which is 
essentially exploitative. . . . Lying violates respect and is 
wrong, as is any breach of trust.  Every lie is a broken 
promise [which] . . . is made and broken at the same moment.  
Every lie necessarily implies—as does every assertion—an 
assurance, a warranty of its truth.
138
 
 
Barbara Herman, along similar lines, has claimed that lying forces the victim 
to become an instrument of the deceiver‘s purposes: 
 
 
a sin deceives himself sadly.‖).  Lies were, for Kant, no more justifiable by virtue of their 
consequences than would be other evil actions, such as murder or theft.  See KANT, supra, at 226. 
135. KANT, supra note 134, at 225–26. 
136. Id.; see also IMMANUEL KANT, ON EDUCATION 104 (Annette Churton trans., Dover 
Publ‘ns, Inc. 2003) (1899) (―[T]here is no single instance in which a lie can be justified.‖) ; Immanuel 
Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in ETHICS 280 (Peter Singer ed., 1994). 
137. According to Samuel Cook, freedom and coercion are generally ―antithetical relations or 
realities‖ such that ―freedom entails the absence of coercion, and coercion involves the absence of 
freedom.‖  Samuel DuBois Cook, Coercion and Social Change, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION 107, 126 
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972). 
138. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 67 (1978). 
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Using deceit to control access to facts, one moves someone to 
deliberate on grounds she believes (falsely) she has assessed 
on their merits. When deceit is effective, it causes the victim 
to have the beliefs necessary for her to adopt ends and choose 
actions that serve the deceiver‘s purposes. The victim‘s will 
becomes an instrument of the deceiver‘s purposes—under the 
deceiver‘s indirect causal control.139 
 
Under both Fried‘s and Herman‘s accounts, the moral problem with lying is 
that it effectively allows the liar to control the victim‘s will.140  Such control is 
incompatible with the view that the victim is a ―possible source of reasons all 
the way down.‖141 
Of course, one might disagree with this concern, at least as framed.  After 
all, controlling another‘s will is not, per se, objectionable.  Many contract 
rules, not to mention many other laws, deal with controlling the will of 
another.
142
  Similarly, even rational persuasion aims, in some sense, to control 
the will of another.
143
  Thus, the moral reprehensibility of lies must turn on the 
 
139. BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 228 (1993).  David Strauss has 
advanced a similar argument with respect to restrictions on free speech.  See David A. Strauss, 
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991).  Strauss 
advances what he calls the ―persuasion principle,‖ which essentially provides that ―harmful 
consequences resulting from the persuasive effects of speech may not be any part of the justification 
for restricting speech.‖  Id. at 335.  Strauss excludes lies from the protection of the persuasion 
principle, however, because the liar effectively subjects her listener to a form of ―mental slavery.‖  
Id. at 354. 
140. See, e.g., 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 378 (2d ed. 1986) (―The type 
of interest protected by the law of deceit is the interest in formulating business judgments without 
being misled by others—in short, in not being cheated.  Generally, the law of deceit is limited to 
misrepresentations that mislead another into an unwise judgment in some business enterprise 
resulting in financial loss.‖ (footnote omitted)).  In this sense, lying resembles other forms of 
coercion, including duress.  See, e.g., Rick Bigwood, Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical 
Constructs of Duress, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 201, 208 (1996) (―What a party really complains about 
when she alleges duress is not that she is altogether deprived of her will but, as with fraud, that her 
will has been subjected to a motive for ‗intentional‘ action from which she ought to have been 
free.‖). 
141. HERMAN, supra note 139, at 230; see also Douglas N. Husak, Paternalism and Autonomy, 
10 PHILO. & PUB. AFF. 27, 28 (1980) (―Deontological theories often employ the notion of moral 
autonomy to stress the dignity and inviolability of the person. What is valuable about persons, 
according to this tradition, is their ability to follow laws that are self-imposed, formulated by 
exercises of their capacity to deliberate and reason.‖). 
142. See Bigwood, supra note 140, at 201 (―Certainly in the negotiations leading up to a 
contract, some degree of persuasion and pressure is both likely and expected, especially in arm‘s-
length commercial context.‖). 
143. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, 
and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2006) (―One can argue that 
other forms of persuasion resting on, say, charisma or personal charm, or even the overbearing 
persistence of a used car salesman, also might treat the listener instrumentally.‖). 
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manner in which the control gets exercised, not merely the fact of control.  In 
this vein, Christine Korsgaard argues that lying is wrong because it treats 
victims in ways to which they cannot assent: 
 
People cannot assent to a way of acting when they are given 
no chance to do so. The most obvious instance of this is when 
coercion is used. But it is also true of deception: the victim of 
the false promise cannot assent to it because he doesn‘t know 
it is what he is being offered.
144
 
 
Thus, at least in Korsgaard‘s view, assent, or the lack thereof, may be deemed 
the critical feature from a deontological perspective in determining the 
morality of a lie.  And, mirroring Kant, Korsgaard contends that assent is 
logically impossible in the case of lies.
145
 
Many of the courts reluctant to enforce no-reliance clauses seem to at least 
implicitly agree with this perspective.  For instance, in the classic Ganley case 
discussed previously, the Minnesota Supreme Court rested much of the 
weight of its decision not to enforce a clear no-reliance clause on the premise 
that ―[f]raud destroys all consent.‖146  In the Ganley court‘s view, fraud is 
corrosive, eroding whatever voluntary choice there might have been to 
support the contract, including the no-reliance clause, in the first place.
147
  
Similarly, in Arnold, the Second Circuit determined that cases refusing to 
enforce no-reliance clauses were correct because they were ―based upon a 
greater consideration for the individual who may suffer wrong through 
deliberate fraud‖ than decisions enforcing such clauses.148  This argument 
favoring the nonenforcement of no-reliance clauses turns on a decidedly 
deontological perception of the morality of fraud. 
Most modern moral philosophers, even of a deontological bent, however, 
do not share Kant‘s and Korsgaard‘s view that lying is a categorical wrong.  
In fact, much of the modern literature on lying aims at uncovering the 
circumstances in which a person may be justified in lying.
149
  Lying may 
 
144. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 138 (1996). 
145. See id. at 138–39 (arguing that even if the victim knows about the lie, she ―cannot really 
assent to the transaction . . . propose[d]‖). 
146. Ganley Bros. v. Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 212 N.W. 602, 603 (Minn. 1927). 
147. See id. 
148. Arnold v. Nat‘l Aniline & Chem. Co., 20 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 1927). 
149. See generally, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 
(1978); Robert N. Van Wyk, When is Lying Morally Permissible? Casuistical Reflections on the 
Game Analogy, Self-Defense, Social Contract Ethics, and Ideals, 24 J. VALUE INQUIRY 155 (1990); 
see also, e.g., BOK, supra, at 108–10 (arguing that intentional deception may be morally acceptable 
in certain circumstances, such as to protect a murderer‘s intended, innocent victim); Jonathan E. 
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compromise autonomy because it undercuts a victim‘s capacity to assent, but 
it hardly follows that it always does so.  Instead, as the law seems to recognize 
in a variety of other contexts, it is possible to assent to a lie and thereby 
obviate any moral concerns regarding it.
150
 
Recognizing that assent to a lie is possible seems to comport with 
common assumptions about lies that are permissible, both outside and inside 
of legal contexts.  For instance, few would argue that lying in order to protect 
the secrecy of a surprise birthday party constitutes a moral offense.  Focusing 
on assent, a neo-Kantian could justify this common reality by noting that the 
person celebrating the birthday retrospectively assents to the lie.  Similarly, 
few would argue that lying during the course of a poker game constitutes a 
moral offense. 
 
Not only is misleading behavior in this context permissible 
and consistent with the general prohibition on deception, but 
we do not much worry that our behavior in poker games will 
corrode the relevant aspects of our moral character—our 
resolve not to lie and to take truth-telling and candor 
seriously.
151
 
 
This is so, a neo-Kantian might argue, because the participants in the game 
have tacitly assented to the lies. 
Even if one does not agree that these particular examples justify lying—or 
even if one believes that establishing assent, even in these contexts, requires 
more exacting proof—the point of this section is a simple one: all but the most 
die-hard Kantians agree that lying is, at least sometimes, justifiable. Thus, 
prohibitions against lying are not categorical, and when such prohibitions 
conflict with other moral goods, the other moral goods may, occasionally, 
prevail.  This seems particularly true in circumstances where a person may be 
said to have assented to the lie or the possibility of a lie. 
B. Consequentialist Rationales 
People depend on others to tell the truth.  Cooperation requires mutual 
honesty (at least most of the time).  The duty to tell the truth (or engage in 
―fair play‖) has gotten its most influential recent articulation by John Rawls. 
 
 
Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. PHIL. 435, 440–41 (1997) (disagreeing with 
Korsgaard‘s argument by showing situations in which one might assent to being told a lie). 
150. Some neo-Kantians would also urge that other justifications for lying may exist, 
particularly in circumstances where the lie can prevent serious injury or death. 
151. Shiffrin, supra note 131, at 743. 
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Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of 
social cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only 
be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. 
Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice 
from each person, or at least involves a certain restriction of 
his liberty.  Suppose finally that the benefits produced by 
cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the scheme 
of cooperation is unstable in the sense that if any one person 
knows that all (or nearly all) of the others will continue to do 
their part, he will still be able to share a gain from the scheme 
even if he does not do his part. Under these conditions a 
person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound 
by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take advantage 
of the free benefit by not cooperating.
152
 
 
Though Rawls himself was a self-professed neo-Kantian, this description of 
mutual trust and cooperation has a consequentialist feel.
153
 
Indeed, consequentialists, like deontologists, tend to view lying as morally 
reprehensible.  Lies degrade the background of trust necessary for mutually 
beneficial interaction.
154
  John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that lies 
undermine mutual trust, ―the insufficiency of which does more than any one 
thing that can be named to keep back civilisation, virtue, everything on which 
human happiness on the largest scale depends.‖155  And although 
consequentialists recognize that prohibitions against lying are not 
categorical,
156
 they often argue for very strong presumptions against lying, 
 
152. John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A 
SYMPOSIUM 3, 9–10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964). 
153. There are, of course, many varied forms of consequentialism.  See generally, e.g., L.W. 
SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS (1996) (describing and discussing various forms of 
consequentialist thought).  For my limited purposes, however, Kent Greenawalt‘s simple definition of 
a generic consequentialism suffices: ―A practice has value from a consequentialist point of view if it 
contributes to some desirable state of affairs. . . .  The force of a consequentialist reason is dependent 
on the factual connection between a practice and the supposed results of the practice.‖  Kent 
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 128 (1989). 
154. See, e.g., Michael Perelman, The Neglected Economics of Trust: The Bentham Paradox 
and Its Implications, 57 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 381, 381–87 (1998) (arguing that ―[t]rust is a central 
component of the way people relate to society,‖ and that it prevents people from rationally pursuing 
self-maximizing strategies that would undermine society). 
155. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 445, 455 
(Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 
260 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., 1950) (―[F]alsehood . . . brings on at last the 
dissolution of human society.‖). 
156. By definition, consequentialists are willing to weigh the consequences of one value or 
choice against another in order to ascertain the best course of action. 
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viewing individuals as ill-equipped to judge the consequences of their 
deceptions.
157
 
In the context of contractual disclaimers of reliance on misrepresentations, 
it is worth focusing on a particularly strong economic rationale that might be 
wielded to justify the decisions of courts that are reluctant to enforce such 
disclaimers.
158
  Contracts, in the economic view, allow promisors to make 
credible promises and representations
159
 so that they can convince promisees 
to enter into mutually beneficial transactions.  A rational promisee will be 
convinced only if she believes that the benefits of accepting a promise or 
representation exceed the costs of relying on it.  The benefits of a promise or 
representation, in turn, hinge in substantial part on the likelihood that the 
promisor will actually perform or that the representation is accurate.  Phrased 
slightly differently, any anticipated benefit that a promisee might gain from a 
promised performance or representation must be discounted by the possibility 
that the promisor will not perform or that the representation is false.
160
 
Of course, even when a promisor has a sincere desire to perform, 
circumstances can arise that make performance impossible, impracticable, or 
inefficient.  Similarly, even the most earnest promisors may be wrong about 
the representations that they make.  Thus, a promisee can never know for 
certain that a promise will be fulfilled or that a representation is true.
161
  But 
the doctrine of fraudulent inducement operates to dissuade promisors from at 
 
157. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 155, at 260 (warning that the slightest lie is ―a first 
transgression which facilitates a second, and familiarizes the odious idea of a falsehood‖). 
158. This discussion is based, in substantial part, on Chapter 5 of Ian Ayres and Gregory 
Klass‘s book, Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent.  See AYRES & KLASS, supra 
note 127, at 83–112. 
159. Promises, of course, may be credible in the absence of legal enforcement.  See, e.g., H. 
Lorne Carmichael, Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle Incentives, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 
65, 67 (1989) (―Self-enforcing contracts are collections of promises that, while they might not be 
legally binding, are nonetheless credible.  Everyone can be confident that the promises will be 
kept.‖); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1641, 1646 (2003) (―[W]e know that contracts often are performed even in the absence of any legal 
sanctions for breach.‖).  Various self-enforcement mechanisms may, in a given situation, suffice to 
render a promise or representation sufficiently credible to convince a promisee to enter into a 
transaction with a promisor.  These self-enforcement mechanisms include reputational sanctions, loss 
of repeat business with the promisor, and norms of reciprocity.  See Scott, supra, at 1646–47. 
160. In other words, the promisee must engage in an expected value exercise.  Expected value 
is the probability of the event occurring multiplied by the value of the event occurring.  See, e.g., 
HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 566–67 (1998) (explaining basic economic 
principles underlying expected value analysis). 
161. There may be, in fact, good reasons to think that even promisors acting in good faith and 
with no active intent to dissemble might over-solicit sunk costs from the promisee in order to reduce 
uncertainty.  This over-solicitation subjects the promisee to the same hazard of opportunistic 
exploitation as does an intentional lie about the likelihood or quality of performance.  See, e.g., Juliet 
P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for 
Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 629 (1993). 
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least intentionally misrepresenting the likelihood of their performance or the 
truthfulness of their assertions.  The doctrine, therefore, serves to help 
promisees more accurately estimate the likelihood of a promised performance 
or the truthfulness of a represented fact.  It thus helps the promisee avoid the 
expensive precaution costs that she might otherwise incur in an effort to avoid 
fraudulent transactions.
162
  Additionally, regular enforcement of the doctrine 
by courts serves to bolster the credibility of promises and representations 
made by promisors.  Promisors and promisees can, accordingly, bargain more 
efficiently over prices, and promisees can make decisions about optimal 
investments and precautions against nonperformance or inaccuracies. 
Viewed in this light, the doctrine of fraudulent inducement plays a critical 
role in effective and efficient contract design.
163
  But this role is far from 
immutable.  The critical concern should be giving promisees the ability to 
estimate the likelihood of a promised performance or the truthfulness of a 
represented fact.  ―[T]here are many situations in which a promisee can find it 
in his interest to rely even though the promisor does not intend to perform‖ or 
the promisor does not guarantee the veracity of his factual representation.
164
  
Promisees may find it in their interest to rely on promises, even if the 
promisor may not perform or may not be telling the truth about a fact, so long 
as the benefits of such reliance outweigh the costs.  So long as promisees are 
put on notice through a no-reliance clause that the likelihood of performance 
or of the veracity of a represented fact is low, there is no good reason to 
second guess the promisee‘s estimation of her participation constraint.165 
As with the generic deontological justifications for prohibiting lying, then, 
consequentialist, and particularly economic, rationales for prohibiting lying in 
contractual dealings may give way, in appropriate circumstances, to 
countervailing moral goods.  Consequentialist objections to lying are not 
categorical. 
 
162. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 
VA. L. REV. 623, 630–31 (1992). 
163. Rules against fraud can also be said to avoid investment inefficiencies.  As Paul Mahoney 
explains: 
 
Because a lie can produce a wealth transfer to defendants that would have been 
impossible in an honest market transaction, defendants will have an incentive to 
devote a positive amount of resources to lying.  Such investments are a source 
of net social cost because any positive allocative outcomes they produce could 
be achieved through an honest market transaction. 
Id. at 631. 
164. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 127, at 93. 
165. To be clear, I am assuming that the parties to a contract containing a no-reliance clause are 
sophisticated and that no other bargaining improprieties are present. 
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C. The Bottom Line 
Dean William L. Prosser once criticized an excessively 
compartmentalized approach to legal analysis that suggests that ―east is east 
and west is west, and never the twain shall meet,‖ because in reality ―there 
are, of course, no such distinctly segregated compartments in the law.‖166  He 
went on to argue that ―[t]he first question which arises in this curious 
dichotomy [between contract and tort law] is, when is a breach of contract 
also a tort? It is obvious that [there cannot be a tort in every breach of contract 
case] . . . or there would be no distinction left at all.‖167 
 
Contract liability is imposed by the law for the protection of a 
single, limited interest, that of having the promises of others 
performed. . . . [Tort law] is directed toward the 
compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses 
which they have suffered within the scope of their legally 
recognized interests generally, rather than one interest only, 
where the law considers that compensation is required.
168
 
 
In those tricky cases where the primary purposes of each area of the law 
overlap or conflict, as is the case with no-reliance clauses, the ―single guiding 
principle,‖ in Dean Prosser‘s view, is that tort ―liability must be [levied 
against only that] conduct which is socially unreasonable.‖169 
In the context of no-reliance clauses, the conduct that could potentially be 
subject to liability is fraud.  As the generic deontological and consequentialist 
arguments rehearsed in the previous sections suggest, fraud constitutes, as a 
general matter, ―socially unreasonable‖ conduct.  Importantly, however, fraud 
is not categorically unreasonable.  In other words, there are other social goods 
that can, in proper circumstances, offset the need to impose liability for fraud. 
In the context of this Article, then, the question becomes whether 
enforcement of no-reliance clauses generates social goods weighty enough to 
offset the need to impose liability for fraud.  By asking this question, I am not 
suggesting that the value of moral prohibitions against fraud is 
commensurable with the value of contractual freedom.  ―In the 
commensurabilist model, other things being equal, if we can compare two 
options in terms of which is more just, or which produces more utility, then 
 
166. Prosser, supra note 14, at 380. 
167. Id. at 387. 
168. KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 1, at 5–6. 
169. Id. at 6. 
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we should pick the option that offers more of the property.‖170  But to say that 
two values cannot precisely be measured and ranked against each other along 
a single metric is not to say ―that the two options cannot be compared at all, or 
ranked as better or worse than the other.‖171  ―When it is impossible to 
deliberate rationally among options by judging which option has more of 
some desired property, but it is still possible to deliberate rationally, the 
objects of deliberation are incommensurably valuable.‖172 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in that deliberation.
173
  
Instead, this Article merely argues that, to date, most courts have failed to 
meaningfully engage in such deliberation, simply assuming that no-reliance 
clauses can have no legitimate value, and serve only to countenance fraud.  As 
the next Part demonstrates, however, the assumption that courts have been 
making is wrong.  There are compelling and legitimate reasons why parties 
might benefit from no-reliance clauses. 
 
170. Strudler, supra note 133, at 1531–32.  Henry Richardson explains the commensurability 
thesis this way: 
 
Two values (or goods) are deliberatively commensurable with respect to a given 
choice if and only if there is some single norm (or good) such that the 
considerations put forward by those two values (or goods) for and against 
choosing each of the available options may be adequately arrayed prior to the 
choice (for purposes of deliberation) simply in terms of the greater or lesser 
satisfaction of that norm (or instantiation of that good). 
HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 104 (1994). 
171. Stephen Gardbaum, Law, Incommensurability, and Expression, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1687, 
1687 (1998) (distinguishing between incomparability and incommensurability).  For an overview of 
incommensurability, see Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1–3 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). 
172. Strudler, supra note 133, at 1533. 
173. As Alasdair MacIntyre has suggested, there may be good reasons to doubt how successful 
such a deliberation can ultimately prove with respect to all fundamental questions: 
 
[T]he great Enlightenment theorists had themselves disagreed both morally and 
philosophically. Their heirs have, through brilliant and sophisticated feats of 
argumentation, made it evident that if these disagreements are not interminable, 
they are such at least that after two hundred years no prospect of termination is 
in sight. Succeeding generations of Kantians, utilitarians, natural rights‘ 
theorists, and contractarians show no signs of genuine convergence. 
2 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered , in ETHICS AND POLITICS: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 172, 181–82 (2006).  Nevertheless, as MacIntyre has also suggested, in solving 
particular problems, we can learn a great deal from utilitarian and Kantian approaches to moral 
philosophy.  See 2 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Truthfulness and Lies: What Can We Learn from Kant?, 
in ETHICS AND POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS 122, 122–42 (2006) (investigating Kantian responses to 
a variety of moral questions); 2 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Truthfulness and Lies: What Can We Learn 
from Kant?, in ETHICS AND POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS 101, 101–21 (2006) (investigating 
utilitarian responses to a variety of moral questions). 
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IV. ―UNRAVELING CERTAIN HUMAN LOTS‖: LEGITIMATE REASONS WHY 
CONTRACTING PARTIES MIGHT USE NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES AND WANT 
THEM ENFORCED 
I at least have so much to do in unraveling certain human lots, 
and seeing how they were woven and interwoven, that all the 
light I can command must be concentrated on this particular 
web, and not dispersed over that tempting range of 
relevancies called the universe.
174
 
 
A significant number of commercial parties include no-reliance clauses in 
their contracts.
175
  Despite this reality, many courts remain skeptical of such 
clauses.  These courts reductively view no-reliance clauses as nothing more 
than licenses to lie.
176
  As Part III argued, these courts then use generic moral 
prohibitions against lying to conclude that no-reliance clauses should not be 
enforced or should be enforced only subject to substantial limitations.  This 
Part contends that courts skeptical of no-reliance clauses mistakenly fail to 
consider several plausible and legitimate reasons why parties might want to 
include no-reliance clauses in their contracts and have such clauses enforced. 
The animating intuition behind the arguments advanced in this Part is that 
parties are, in general, the best judges of their self-interest and that they enter 
into contracts because they expect mutual gains from trade.
177
  If this intuition 
accurately describes at least some commercial dealings, then a more 
thoroughgoing exploration of why commercial parties often include no-
reliance clauses in their contracts is needed. 
One possible explanation for the presence of no-reliance clauses in 
commercial contracts might be that, with respect to such clauses, parties 
systematically suffer from one or more cognitive biases that impair their 
ability to make rational judgments.  A number of biases could vie for 
contention here.  For instance, people might be overly optimistic or confident, 
particularly when they are investing in contractual preparations.
178
  This 
overconfidence could cause them to underestimate the extent to which they 
 
174. GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH 141 (Rosemary Ashton ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1871). 
175. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra Part II.B–C. 
177. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (―[C]ontract law should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to 
maximize the joint gains (the ‗contractual surplus‘) from transactions.‖). 
178. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW & ECONOMICS 144, 149 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (―One of the most robust findings in the 
literature of individual decision making is that of the systematic tendency of many people to overrate 
their own abilities, contributions, and talents.‖). 
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are likely to be defrauded.
179
 Alternatively (or in addition), people may be 
poor at calculating the probabilities of future events, especially risks.  This 
calculating deficiency may cause people to systematically underestimate the 
risk that they will be defrauded.
180
  Individuals might also suffer from what is 
often referred to as a ―personal positivity bias,‖ which leads people to 
generally perceive others in a positive light.  If a person is honest, she may 
view others as honest, even if such a view is naïve.  Coupled with the concept 
of cognitive dissonance,
181
 individuals may be especially reluctant to reach the 
conclusion that they have made a mistake in deciding to trust someone.
182
  
Finally, people may simply be very bad at detecting fraud, though they think 
they have the ability to do so,
183
 and they might be particularly susceptible to 
oral communications, even when they have the intention to rely only on 
written communications.
184
  Given the sophistication of the parties involved, 
however, and considering their diversity, as well as the diversity of 
transaction types in which no-reliance clauses are used, it is difficult to 
imagine any pattern of cognitive bias that could account for all of the uses of 
no-reliance clauses.
185
 
In contrast, several rational reasons exist for parties to enter into no-
reliance clauses.  First, a seller might want to include a no-reliance clause 
because, ex ante, it believes that there is a high risk that the buyer will try to 
hold the seller up by asserting, ex post, that the seller made fraudulent 
assertions.  A no-reliance clause operates as a barrier to such a holdup 
problem.  Sellers may be acutely concerned about the risk of a holdup in 
complex deals for at least two reasons: (1) in such deals, numerous different 
interactions between different buyer and seller agents on multiple facets of the 
deal may take place, potentially making the costs of verifying to a court that 
no fraud actually occurred particularly high; and (2) in such deals, the 
assertions being made may themselves be complex, thus increasing the risks 
that a court will erroneously conclude that an assertion was fraudulent when, 
in fact, it was merely negligent, inadvertent, or not factually incorrect at all. 
 
179. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 362–63 (2003). 
180. See id. at 363–64. 
181. See, e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (describing 
cognitive dissonance as the tendency to suppress information inconsistent with pos itions taken in 
order to preserve psychological consistency). 
182. See Prentice, supra note 179, at 365. 
183. See id. at 366–67. 
184. See id. at 369–71. 
185. Significantly, there is little research to suggest that firms suffer from cognitive biases.  To 
the contrary, it is likely that firms tend to correct for cognitive biases due to market pressures, even if 
individuals in the firm suffer from them.  See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 177, at 550–54. 
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Second, a seller might want to include a no-reliance clause in situations 
where its agents are heavily involved in making pre-contractual and 
contractual representations, it is expensive for the seller to monitor its agents‘ 
conduct, and the buyer might be in a better position to monitor or observe the 
agents or protect itself against the agents‘ actions at a lower cost.  Third, 
buyers or sellers might want to include a no-reliance clause in order to 
enhance precontractual information exchange, particularly in complex 
transactions where the functionality of a product or service may hinge, in part, 
on how that product or service interacts with the buyer‘s particular business.  
Inclusion of a no-reliance clause may, in such circumstances, facilitate a freer 
exchange of information by reducing the threat of postcontractual allegations 
of fraud.  Finally, buyers might want to include a no-reliance clause in order 
to protect their legitimate investments in private (as opposed to public) 
information about valuation. 
Buyers (or sellers) might well be willing to acquiesce to a no-reliance 
clause for at least three somewhat overlapping reasons.  First, the alternative 
might be to pay a higher contract price.  One party may well believe that it 
can protect itself against the other party‘s potentially fraudulent assertions at a 
lower cost.  A second, and closely related, reason why a party might accept a 
no-reliance clause is that it may believe that the risks of fraud are low. This 
may be especially true in circumstances where the party either already has, or 
can inexpensively obtain, sufficient information to gauge the truthfulness of 
the other party‘s assertions.  Finally, a party might accept a no-reliance clause 
because it believes that nonlegal sanctions, such as reputational sanctions or 
the threat of ceasing further dealings, which might otherwise be crowded out 
or diminished by legal sanctions, are sufficient deterrents to the other party‘s 
fraud. 
A. Affirmative Reasons Why Parties Might Want to Include No-Reliance 
Clauses and Have Them Enforced 
1. Holdup by a Buyer Alleging Fraud 
A seller may legitimately fear that sales representations it made to the 
buyer could be turned against it after the contract exists.  Complex deals, as 
previously noted, often require that sellers and their agents make numerous 
different representations at different times to different constellations of the 
buyers‘ agents.  The volume of representations made in complex deals, 
coupled with the diversity of players involved, increases the likelihood of 
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misunderstandings and confusion.
186
  As deals get more and more 
complicated, buyers have increasing opportunities to allege fraudulent 
inducement.  This sort of allegation threatens to impose significant costs on a 
seller and thus gives a buyer leverage that it can use after contract formation 
to renegotiate the terms of the deal in its favor.
187
 
The most obvious costs are those related to the development of a factual 
and legal defense. Deception can be difficult to detect, even after the fact.
188
  
Unless the seller had in place extensive and costly monitoring allowing it not 
only to observe all of the representations made by its agents during 
precontractual negotiations
189
 but also to translate those observations into 
verifiable evidence for a future court, the seller will face expensive challenges 
in reconstructing the events surrounding alleged incidents of fraud.
190
  But 
such a reconstruction is vital.  Fraud cases are fact-intensive.  Indeed, other 
than having to clear relatively minor pleading hurdles,
191
 a plaintiff alleging 
fraud stands a very good chance of surviving any pretrial efforts that a 
 
186. The possibility of confusion may be particularly acute in complex transactions, as Part 
IV.A.3 suggests, because sellers may not know everything about their products or services, at least in 
the context of the buyer‘s proposed use or need for those products or services. 
187. Holdup problems, like this one, occupy the attentions of many contract and organizational 
theorists.  See, e.g., CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 7 (Scott E. Masten ed., 
1996); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 661, 685–87, 693–702 (2007). 
188. See, e.g., Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of 
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 67–77 (1973) (discussing cases in which providers of repair service 
falsely diagnose a need for the service and considering how difficult it can be, ex post, to discover 
this fraud). 
189. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (1984) (describing how parties may undertake 
inefficient precautions); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. &  ORG. 279, 289 (1986) (same). 
 As discussed in Part IV.A.2, there may be circumstances in which it is less costly for buyers to 
monitor sellers‘ agents.  In the absence of a no-reliance clause, however, a buyer might not be 
sufficiently motivated to invest in such monitoring, banking instead on its ability to hold the seller 
liable for fraud if the seller‘s agent acts inappropriately. 
190. For a discussion of the distinctions between observable and verifiable information in the 
contractual setting, see Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete 
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 279–80 (1992). 
191. Fraud, in most jurisdictions, must be pleaded with ―particularity.‖  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. 
P. 9(b).  The requirement of pleading the circumstances of an alleged fraud with particularity, 
however, ―does not render the general principles of simplicity set forth in Rule 8 entirely inapplicable 
to pleadings alleging fraud; rather, as a significant number of federal courts from throughout the 
country have said over the years, . . . the two rules must be read in conjunction with each other.‖  5A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1298 (3d 
ed. 2004 & Supp. 2008).   In Judge Easterbrook‘s now-famous words, Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff 
to plead at most the ―first paragraph of any newspaper story.‖  DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 
624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).  Thus the particularity requirement does not pose a substantial hurdle, in 
most cases, to fraud claims. 
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defendant might make to cut short the litigation.  Even if a seller is absolutely 
convinced (and correct) that it did not commit fraud, mustering sufficient 
evidence to defeat a motivated buyer‘s claims can be very costly. 
Moreover, even when a seller is prepared to raise its defense, the dispute 
resolution process itself imposes significant costs on the seller.  This is 
particularly true with respect to fraud claims because, as just noted, such 
claims stand a good chance of surviving until the end of a trial on the merits.  
Sellers faced with fraud claims, then, are likely to be forced to incur legal fees 
through a trial and then face the unpredictability of the legal system.  
Specifically, sellers run the risk that courts will not be able to distinguish 
accurately between representations that were fraudulent and representations 
that were merely inaccurate or puffery.
192
  In the context of fraud claims, the 
costs associated with an erroneous judgment may be compounded by the 
threat of punitive damages.
193
 
In short, in our system, a trial often constitutes a failure. 
 
Although we celebrate [the trial] as the centerpiece of our 
system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon 
method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. . . .  Much 
of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote 
settlement and avoid trial.  More important, the nature of our 
civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, 
delays, and uncertainties of trial . . . .
194
 
 
 
192. Litigation necessarily includes the risk that a court will err in its judgment.  This risk is 
frequently referred to as an error cost. 
 
Error costs are the social costs associated with erroneous legal judgments 
and are a function of several variables.  Erroneous judgments include decisions 
for undeserving defendants (Type I errors) and decisions for undeserving 
plaintiffs (Type II errors).  The expected cost of each individual error is the 
product of the probability of the error (q1 or q2) and the magnitude of the error 
(EC1 or EC2).  Total error costs additionally depend on the fraction of 
defendants who are truly liable (k) and the total quantity of litigation (Q). In the 
loss function expressed above, total Type I error costs are kQq1EC1 and total 
Type II error costs are (1-k)Qq2EC2. The probability of error (q1 or q2), will 
depend on several variables: the standard of proof used by the court, the 
allocation of burdens, and the court‘s level of confidence in the accuracy of its 
decision. 
Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997 BYU L. REV. 1, 5 
(1997) (footnotes omitted). 
193. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1381 (2000) (noting the possibility of 
punitive damages when intentional misrepresentation is ―sufficiently malicious or oppressive‖). 
194. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations 
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
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The fear of a potential fraud claim can cast a long shadow over completed 
transactions, generating instability.  Judge Posner concisely summarized these 
concerns when considering a party‘s attempt to attach a tort claim for fraud to 
its breach of contract claim: 
 
There is a risk of turning every breach of contract suit into a 
fraud suit, of circumventing the limitation that the doctrine of 
consideration is supposed however ineptly to place on making 
all promises legally enforceable, and of thwarting the rule that 
denies the award of punitive damages for breach of 
contract.
195
 
 
In light of the costs associated with defending against a buyer‘s fraud 
claim, it is not surprising that a seller might worry that a buyer will hold it up 
in an effort to renegotiate the contract.  To account for this possibility, sellers 
might either increase the price of the deal for the buyer, to offset this risk, or 
offer to include a no-reliance clause that either eliminates or reduces the 
seller‘s potential liability for fraud. 
2. Agency Monitoring Costs 
A seller might want to include a no-reliance clause in its contract with a 
buyer because it is concerned about the discretion given to its agents and the 
possibility than an agent will make either an intentional misrepresentation to a 
buyer or a representation that could be mistaken for an intentional 
misrepresentation.  Agents, after all, may have their own independent 
strategies to pursue during the course of their work for the seller, and these 
strategies may not line up with the seller‘s goals.196  In the face of concern 
about its agents‘ representations, a seller can, of course, take precautions such 
as monitoring the agent in order to catch and correct any misrepresentations 
before they are communicated to, or at least relied on by, the buyer.
197
  It may 
 
195. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Charles Miller, 
Comment, Contortions Over Contorts: A Distinct Damages Requirement?, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1257, 1263 (1997) (citing Laurence P. Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 284, 284 (1959)) (noting that potentially at stake in fraudulent inducement cases ―are punitive 
damages, which are generally unavailable for a breach of contract, but which may be available in 
cases where the conduct in question constitutes both a breach of contract and a tort‖). 
196. See, e.g., Robert E. Benfield, Comment, Curing American Managerial Myopia: Can the 
German System of Corporate Governance Help?, 17 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & COMP. L.J. 615, 617 (1995) 
(noting that ―[c]orporate managers necessarily pursue short-term growth strategies in order to 
appease their shareholder[] and thereby significantly increase the cost of funding long-term research 
and development‖). 
197. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate 
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1057–58 (1993) (noting that without a 
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be difficult, however, for the seller to monitor all of its representations, 
especially on a regular basis.  And, even if such monitoring can be done, ―[i]t 
is quite possible for an agent to make a fraudulent misrepresentation even 
though the enterprise has taken all reasonable precautions to prevent him from 
doing so.‖198  In any event, such monitoring will be costly, and in at least 
some circumstances, it may well be that the buyer can protect itself against 
misrepresentations made by the seller‘s agent at a lower cost.199  After all, the 
buyer ―is in an excellent position to be aware of all the representations that 
have been made by the agent and whether they are material.‖200 
But a buyer may not be motivated, in the absence of a no-reliance clause, 
to expend its resources in monitoring the seller‘s agent‘s representations.201  If 
a seller‘s agent makes a misrepresentation, the buyer can sue the seller for 
fraud.
202
  Thus, without a no-reliance clause, the seller could bear an 
inefficiently large cost—the cost of monitoring its agents—that could 
otherwise be shared between the parties.  While the seller can certainly charge 
more for its product in order to offset these costs, in many states a no-reliance 
clause limiting or eliminating fraud liability for the seller might more 
efficiently fit the actual needs of the parties. 
 
reward/punish mechanism, agents may shirk responsibilities).  There are a variety of other 
precautions that sellers can, and likely will, take, such as training agents, providing agents with 
incentives, expressly limiting the authority of agents, and randomly sampling the work of agents.  
See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 
265, 276 (1998) (discussing some monitoring and control mechanisms, including that principals may 
reward agents to encourage them to act in the principals‘ best interests).  For the purposes of this 
argument, however, I presume that most of these precautions would be taken by a seller regardless of 
the particular structure of the seller‘s agreement with a buyer.  This presumption rests on the intuition 
that, in an agency relationship, the principal decides whether to invest before the agent has acted.  
Thus, the principal necessarily faces a moral-hazard problem because the agent has the choice of 
either cooperating and investing or appropriating the principal‘s investment.  See, e.g., Robert D. 
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the 
New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1657–77 (1996) (discussing an agent‘s choice).  
Principals are thus likely to take precautions to ensure that their agents act appropriately. 
198. Davis, supra note 13, at 509. 
199. ―In many situations, . . . it will be impossible for an enterprise to monitor all of the pre-
contractual representations being made by its agents at a reasonable cost. . . .  In these types of 
situations it might be useful to recruit the enterprise‘s trading partner to assist in the process of 
monitoring the agent.‖   Id. at 511–12. 
200. Id. at 512. 
201. Id. 
202. This, of course, may be an exaggeration.  In many instances, it may still be in the buyer‘s 
interests to monitor the seller‘s agent because the costs associated with proving—verifying—any 
misrepresentations to a court are greater than the costs of monitoring. 
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3. Information Streamlining 
A seller might also want to include a no-reliance clause in her contract 
with a buyer in order to enhance incentives for information exchange.  In 
complex transactions, the standard binary adage that sellers know everything 
about their products or services and buyers know everything about their needs 
or desires may not hold true.  Instead, a seller may be offering a complex 
good or service that has unique characteristics or features in the context of a 
buyer‘s particular objectives.  In such circumstances, the accuracy of a seller‘s 
assertions about its goods or services may hinge, in significant part, on a high 
degree of information exchange between the parties.  In order to make truthful 
representations about its product or service, a seller might need detailed 
information from a buyer about its business, but in order to understand what 
information about its business is relevant, a buyer might need detailed 
information about a seller‘s product or service.  Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, sellers may not be able to accurately discern what aspects of their 
products or services are most relevant to buyers‘ needs—are material, in the 
parlance of fraud
203—without a high degree of information exchange. 
Although parties generally have incentives to share information during 
contractual negotiations, in order to ensure that beneficial trade is possible,
204
 
in the context of particularly complex goods or services, these natural 
incentives may not be strong enough to ensure free exchange.  In the absence 
of a no-reliance clause insulating it from future threats of fraud, a seller may 
be reticent to engage in the necessary exchange—or may engage in this 
exchange only after charging a higher contract price—for fear that its 
incomplete and potentially inaccurate assertions may later be used against it.  
On the other side, in the absence of a no-reliance clause, a buyer may not be 
induced to gather and share necessary information about its needs or desires, 
preferring instead to foist all of the risks and costs associated with such an 
investigation onto the seller.  In these cases, and in the absence of an 
enforceable no-reliance clause, deals either may not get made or may get 
made only at suboptimal prices. 
No-reliance clauses, in this context, can effectively give the seller a little 
more freedom to share information and give the buyer a little more incentive 
to gather information.  Importantly, this rationale for the existence of no-
reliance clauses extends the intuition behind arguments that favor limiting the 
liability of parties for promissory estoppel based on precontractual 
 
203. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) (stating that ―[r]eliance upon a 
fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless the matter misrepresented is material‖ and then 
describing the materiality requirement). 
204. See Johnston, supra note 36, at 390. 
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representations.
205
  Professor Jason Johnston, for instance, has argued that in 
some instances there will be no need for legal liability to attach to 
precontractual negotiations (and that legal liability would, in fact, be 
counterproductive) because the parties themselves will have a private 
incentive to engage in ―‗cheap talk.‘‖206  ―[W]hen the parties have at least 
some interests in common, even cheap talk—talk that involves no direct 
cost—may be credible and informative.‖207  In these circumstances, the parties 
will have private incentives to engage truthfully and accurately in cheap talk 
about the probabilities and characteristics of performance because of the 
―parties‘ mutual interest in minimizing wasteful expense in investigating and 
negotiating when there is in fact no possibility of mutually beneficial 
trade.‖208  When, however, ―a speaker is held legally liable for damages if 
trade does not occur after the speaker makes a promissory (or more generally) 
optimistic statement in courtship, that message is, as an economic matter, no 
longer cheap talk.‖209  While Professor Johnston does not argue that all 
promissory estoppel liability should be eliminated, he suggests that at least in 
some circumstances, cheap talk may be more efficient than the legally 
mandated alternatives.
210
  No-reliance clauses allow parties to talk ―cheaply‖ 
without fear of legal sanction for fraud. 
4. Protecting Investments in Private Information 
Buyers (or potentially sellers) might want to include no-reliance clauses, 
which in this context would insulate them from liability for misstatements 
made in buyers‘ warranties, in order to protect their investment in private 
information.  For example, a real estate developer might want to buy a parcel 
of property P
2 
because it already owns an adjacent parcel P
1
 and knows that P
1 
will be turned into a strip mall (with a Barnes & Noble and a variety of other 
high-traffic stores).  The developer wants P
2
 because she believes that she can 
turn it into a gas station and make a great deal of money.  In the course of 
negotiations, the current owner of P
2
 might inquire about whether the 
developer knows anything about what is being done with P
1
.  The developer 
could, of course, say nothing.  But she then runs the risk of having the current 
owner of P
2
 suspect that she is hiding something and hold out for more 
money.  Alternatively, the developer could tell the current owner of P
2 
about 
the strip mall plans, thus virtually guaranteeing a holdup.  Finally, the 
 
205. See generally, e.g., id. 
206. Id. at 389 (footnote omitted). 
207. Id. at 390. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
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developer could lie.  If she does so, however, she might well face a potential 
fraud claim. 
No-reliance clauses, in this context, serve to foster productive investment 
in information-gathering by allowing buyers to protect that investment.  
Twenty years ago, Professor Kronman advanced the argument that contract 
law can tolerate nondisclosure by one who is protecting such an investment.
211
  
Although he went on to dismiss the possibility that affirmative 
misrepresentations could also be allowed,
212
 others have been more bold.
213
  
Professor Levmore, for instance, has argued that because ―nondisclosure on 
the part of the buyer [is conceptually permissible] in order to maintain a 
socially beneficial incentive structure,‖ it does not make sense to allow sellers 
to undermine this structure by merely asking, ―‗Do you have any information 
about properties or developments in this area of the world such that if I shared 
your knowledge, I would be likely to raise my sale price by ten percent or 
more?‘‖214 In such circumstances, society‘s interests may well be served by 
allowing the buyer to give a dishonest answer, since that is the only way of 
protecting its informational investment. 
A relevant and similar right to lie is now commonly defended in the 
jurisprudence of corporations.  In some circumstances, it may make sense to 
allow executives, acting on behalf of a corporation contemplating a major 
transaction, such as the acquisition of another corporation, to lie about their 
intentions, when such lies protect the interests of their shareholders by 
limiting speculation that might increase the price of stock in the corporation to 
be acquired.  Defenders of this right to lie argue that shareholders sometimes 
should be permitted to vote to give executives the express right to lie to 
them.
215
 
 
211. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–18 (1978).  Professor Kronman used a similar scenario, based on a real dispute, 
to illustrate his arguments.  In the dispute, a large company, Texas Gulf Sulphur, spent time and 
money conducting aerial surveys of land in Ontario, Canada, and concluded that there was a 
likelihood of valuable mineral deposits under farmland owned by the estate of Murray Hendrie.  
Based on this information, Texas Gulf Sulphur purchased an option for effectively $18,000 on 
mineral and surface rights in the Hendrie property.  It turned out that mineral deposits under the 
Hendrie tract were worth approximately $1 billion. In Professor Kronman‘s view, if the Hendrie 
property sellers were entitled to learn the Texas Gulf‘s private valuation information, the sellers 
would gain an unwarranted windfall.  Id. 
212. Id. at 19 n.49. 
213. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 
68 VA. L. REV. 117, 138–42 (1982) (arguing that the law should tolerate affirmative 
misrepresentation in some circumstances). 
214. Id. at 138, 139. 
215. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis 
of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (1990) (suggesting that it is legally 
acceptable under a ―fiduciary duty analysis‖ for a corporation publicly and falsely to deny 
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On the other hand, allowing buyers to have a free pass to lie to sellers 
without any warning whatsoever may be too extreme.  No-reliance clauses 
strike a balance, allowing buyers to protect their informational investments 
while also putting sellers on notice that they should discount buyers‘ 
representations when calculating their participation constraint. 
B. Reasons Why Parties Might Acquiesce to the Inclusion of a No-Reliance 
Clause 
1. Lower Costs of Self-Protection 
A buyer may agree to the inclusion of a no-reliance clause because, in 
exchange, it can demand a lower price for the goods or services from the 
seller.  The savings may well be greater than what the buyer believes it will 
spend in taking precautions to guard against seller fraud.  This straightforward 
cost-benefit rationale fits comfortably with the next two rationales that may 
entice a buyer to accept a no-reliance clause. 
2. Low Risk of Seller Fraud 
Buyers may agree to the inclusion of a no-reliance clause because they 
view the risk of seller fraud to be very low.  Buyers may view the risk as low 
because, in the particular circumstances of the transaction, they have access to 
sufficient information to determine, at a low cost, the veracity of seller‘s 
representations.  Alternatively, the buyer may not care about the veracity of 
the seller‘s representations because the buyer may be relying exclusively on 
its own evaluation of the seller‘s goods or services, without regard to the 
seller‘s representations.  Finally, the buyer may trust the seller because of 
repeated interactions with the seller. 
3. Equivalency or Superiority of Extra-Legal Sanctions 
Finally, a buyer may agree to a no-reliance clause because it concludes 
that extra-legal sanctions available to deter seller fraud are sufficient, or 
perhaps even superior to, legal sanctions.
216
  Extra-legal or informal 
enforcement mechanisms may include reputational sanctions, opportunities 
 
involvement in merger negotiations when ―a rational shareholder group would have endorsed [this] 
strategy‖); see also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 
77 VA. L. REV. 945, 997 (1991) (arguing that there is a default ―fiduciary duty to tell the truth‖ that 
corporations can avoid by contracting ―to waive this warranty‖). 
216. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear 
from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON 757, 780–89 (1993) (finding that the market value 
of the common stock of corporations that were either alleged to have committed fraud or were 
convicted of fraud fell significantly following announcement of the allegations or conviction and that 
very little of the fall in value could be attributed to expected legal penalties). 
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for repeat business interactions, and norms of reciprocal fairness.
217
  
Essentially, all of these mechanisms provide credibility to contractual 
commitments and representations without the need for third-party (court) 
enforcement.
218
 
In general, contracting parties want to earn and maintain a good reputation 
with potential contracting partners and the general business community.
219
  A 
good reputation helps generate future business opportunities with high-caliber 
contracting partners, and it enhances one‘s self-esteem.220  The threat of 
having a good reputation sullied can often operate to prevent one contracting 
party from opportunistically exploiting the other.  Similarly, the prospects of 
future dealings with a contracting partner often operate to curb opportunistic 
behavior.
221
  But even in circumstances where reputational sanctions or 
concerns about future business dealings are not powerful enough to prevent 
nefarious behavior, there are strong reasons to believe that norms
222
 of 
 
217. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 159, at 1644–45. 
218. Numerous commentators have analyzed the merits and risks of self-enforcing contracts.  
See generally, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of 
Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-
Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 
53 J. BUS. 27 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177 (1985). 
219. See, e.g., Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 
2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 287, 287–95 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998) (describing how cultural and social standing impact self-enforcement); Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 177, at 557. 
220. Though powerful, reputational sanctions may have distinct limits.  The threat of reputation 
sanctions works best to deter opportunistic conduct when other potential trading partners and the 
business community can easily learn why a deal broke down.  Reputational sanctions, then, tend to 
work most effectively in small communities where information travels swiftly.  See, e.g., Greif, 
supra note 219, at 287–95. 
221. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 159, at 1646 (―[W]here parties contemplate repeated 
interactions, neither party will breach an agreement if the expected gains from breaching are less than 
the expected returns from future transactions that breach would sacrifice.‖).  Like reputational 
sanctions, however, the threat of losing future dealings has limits, particularly when parties believe 
that a relationship is about to end.  See id. (―[T]he anticipation of the last transaction may cause the 
entire cooperative pattern to unravel.‖). 
222. Different definitions of the term ―norms‖ abound in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Cooter, 
supra note 197, at 1656–57 (defining norms as imposing obligations); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999) (defining norms as ―all 
rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and organizational rules‖); 
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 
340 (1997) (defining norms as ―informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow 
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both‖); 
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699–1701 (1996) 
(defining norms as rules distinguishing desirable and undesirable behaviors while giving a third party 
the authority to punish those engaging in behaviors that are undesirable); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 364 n.24 
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reciprocal fairness can ensure fair dealings.
223
  Experimental evidence 
indicates that a preference for reciprocity—the willingness to reward 
cooperation and to punish selfishness—can motivate cooperation even in 
arms-length interactions between complete strangers.
224
 
All of these informal enforcements of norms against fraud may have 
several advantages over formal legal enforcement.
225
  First, informal 
enforcement avoids the direct institutional costs of legal enforcement.  
Perhaps most significantly, informal enforcement can kick in even if the 
parties can only observe—but could not, at a reasonable cost, verify to a 
court—violations of the norms against fraud.  Moreover, informal 
enforcement has other advantages, especially in the context of fraud.  At least 
in some contexts, informal processes may result in more sensitive fact-
finding.  Those who know the parties may have insights about their intentions 
and understandings, both critically relevant to determinations of whether 
particular conduct is fraudulent, negligent, or merely mistaken, that would 
elude a court.
226
 
In light of the potential advantages of informal enforcement, rational 
contracting parties will compare the relative costs and benefits of using 
 
(2003) (defining norms as ―behavioral regularities that arise when humans are interacting with each 
other‖); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) 
(using a rough definition of norms as ―social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying wha t 
ought to be done and what ought not to be done‖). 
223. ―Recent work in experimental economics suggests . . . that the domain of self-enforcing 
contracts may be considerably larger than has been conventionally understood.  A robust result of 
these experiments is that a significant fraction of individuals behave as if reciprocity were an 
important motivation (even in isolated interactions with strangers) . . . .‖  Scott, supra note 159, at  
1644. 
224. See generally Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and 
Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817 (1999); David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in 
Experiments, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593  (1998); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into 
Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993). 
225. Some have argued that the introduction of legal constraints may be counterproductive, by 
―undermining incentives to develop private cooperative arrangements and by creating incentives for 
entrepreneurs to invest in rent seeking.‖  Bruce L. Benson, Economic Freedom and the Evolution of 
Law, 18 CATO J. 209, 229 (1998); see also, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering 
and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1140 
(1997) (arguing that ―private ordering generates substantive legal principles that are superior to those 
that the state produces‖).  Indeed, Larry Ribstein contends that trust is essential to efficient 
transactions and that the introduction of legally compulsory contracts may, at least sometimes, be 
counterproductive.  Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 570 (2001).  By providing 
for the legal enforcement of contracts, the law, he maintains, may ―crowd out‖ the trust that enhances 
efficient transactions or even promote distrust.  See id. at 576–85. 
226. Thomas A. Smith, Equality, Evolution and Partnership Law, 3 J. BIOECONOMICS 99, 110–
14 (2001) (discussing the literature and suggesting its application to partnership law). 
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nonlegal, as opposed to legal, sanctions when determining whether or not to 
disclaim legal liability for fraud through a no-reliance clause.
227
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lies are often wrong.  Lies may compromise the autonomy of their 
victims, and they may treat their victims unfairly.  Moreover, lies may result 
in allocational inefficiencies, causing a victim to buy something that she does 
not really want, and lies may erode the fabric of trust essential to cooperative 
behavior.  Based on these generic moralisms, a majority of courts faced with 
no-reliance clauses, which effectively give one or both parties the freedom to 
lie, either refuse to enforce them altogether or enforce them only subject to 
significant limitations. 
I have argued, however, that these courts have reached their conclusion 
too easily.  They presume that no-reliance clauses can serve no legitimate 
contract function and thus have no legitimate value.  But, at least in some 
cases where sophisticated parties contract with one another, no-reliance 
clauses can—and do—serve valuable contracting functions.  With the core 
assumption made by a majority of courts reluctant to enforce no-reliance 
clauses dispelled, I suggest that at least the generic formulations of a moral 
prohibition against fraud are insufficient to counterbalance the value gained 
by autonomous parties choosing what they rationally believe to be in their 
best self-interest. Thus, courts should either enforce no-reliance clauses 
without significant restrictions or carefully articulate a more robust moral 
basis for a public policy prohibition against such clauses. 
 
227. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV.  
373, 379–83 (1990). 
